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1998-2001 VETERANS BENEFITS DECISIONS
INTRODUCTION

This Article reviews Federal Circuit decisions in veterans benefits
appeals from the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims
from 1998 to September 2001.
It does not, however, address
decisions regarding claims for attorney fees under the Equal Access
to Justice Act. Articles in the Federal Circuit review issue generally
address case law decided during the preceding year in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Because this is the
first review of veterans benefits cases to be published in the Federal
Circuit review issue, this Article will cover a longer time period.
I.

1988-2001-A BRIEF OVERVIEW 2

Judicial review of veterans benefits decisions in the Federal Circuit
is a fairly recent phenomenon, having commenced little more than a

decade ago. Before 1988, a claimant seeking veterans benefits could
appeal, following an adverse decision at the agency Regional Office
level, to the Board of Veterans' Appeals ("Board"). 3 No judicial
review of the Board's decisions existed, however, until 1988.
In 1988, the Veterans' Judicial Review Act4 created the United
States Court of Veterans Appeals, 5 an Article I court.6 On November
11, 1998, that court underwent a name change, becoming the United

1. This Article does not address the Federal Circuit's opinion in Schism v. United
States, 239 F.3d 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Schism was an appeal from a U.S. district court
decision granting summary judgment in favor of the U.S. Government and Secretary
of Defense, against retired veterans contending that the Government breached its
contractual obligation by failing to provide free, lifetime health care to petitioner
veterans and their dependants. Id. at 1282; see also Lt. Col. Elling Major Broyles,
Military Retiree Medical Care-Broken Promises or Failureto Read The Fine Print?, 1998
ARMYLAw. 62, 63 (1998).
2. Portions of this Part are adapted from Gary E. O'Connor, Did Decide or Should
Have Decided: Issue Exhaustionand the Veterans Benefits Appeals Process, 49 AM. U. L. REV.
1279 (Aug. 2000).
3. See 38 U.S.C. § 7104(a) (2002) (providing that all questions in a matter shall
be subject to one review on appeal to the Secretary of Veterans Affairs and that final
decisions on such appeal shall be made by the Board); see also 38 C.F.R. § 20.101
(2002) (outlining the jurisdiction of the Board).
4. Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105 (1988) (codified at 38 U.S.C. § 7251
(1994)).
5. See Veterans' Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100-687, § 4051, 102 Stat. 4105,
4113 (establishing a new Article I "court of record"); see also WInAMi F. Fox, JR., THE
UNrTED STATES COURT OF VETERANS APPEAIS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE JURISPRUDENCE,

ORGANIZATION, AND OPERATION OF THE NEvEsT ARTICLE ONE COURT 13-27 (2d ed.

1998).
6. See 38 U.S.C. § 7253 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (setting forth the exact
composition of the new court and discussing the manner of judicial appointment);
see also Fox, supra note 5, at 19-20 (discussing the Court of Appeals for Veterans
Claims as an Article I court).
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States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims ("CAVC"). 7 The 1988
Act made possible review of the decisions of the CAVC in the Federal
Circuit.8 Congress, however, limited the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction
over decisions of the CAVC, to appeals challenging the validity of any
statute, regulation, or any interpretations thereof,9 or appeals raising
constitutional issues. ° Additionally, an issue otherwise within the
Federal Circuit's jurisdiction must be one upon which the CAVC
relied in making its decision."
Although the CAVC issued its first published opinion in January
1990,12 it was not until March 1991 that the Federal Circuit issued its
first published opinion involving an appeal from the CAVC.'3 For the
first several years that the Federal Circuit reviewed CAVC decisions,
there were relatively few appeals and the Federal Circuit generally did
not disturb the CAVC's case law. From 1991 to 1996, veterans
benefits appeals averaged approximately five percent of the filings in
the Federal Circuit. 4 Beginning in 1997, however, the number of
filings increased dramatically-a forty-two percent increase in 1997,'5
7. Veterans Programs Enhancement Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-368, § 511,
112 Stat. 3315, 3341 (codified at 38 U.S.C. § 7251 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)).
8. See Veterans' Judicial Review Act § 4092(a) (codified at 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a))
(providing authority to United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to
exercise jurisdiction over cases on review from the CAVC).
9. 38U.S.C.§7292(a), (d)(1).
10. Id. § 7292(d)(1).
11. Id. § 7292(a).
12. The CAVC's first published opinion was In re Quigley, 1 Vet. App. 1 (1990).
13. Machado v. Derwinski, 928 F.2d 389 (Fed. Cir. 1991), marked the first
published opinion in which the Federal Circuit decided an appeal from the CAVC.
14. The Administrative Office of the United States Courts annually prepares
statistical reports showing the number of veterans benefits appeals filed in the
Federal Circuit for various twelve-month periods, as well as noting the total number
of all appeals filed in the Federal Circuit during that same period. In 1991, veterans
benefits claims comprised 40 (or 2.70%) of the 1,484 appeals filed in the Federal
Circuit. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, JUDICIAL BUsINESS OF
THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 1991 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 185 app. I, tbl. B-8 (1991).
In 1992, they comprised 88 (or 5.17%) of the 1,702 appeals filed. ADMINISTRATWE
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS: ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 171 app. I, tbl. B-8 (1992) [hereinafter
ANNuAL REPORT]. In 1993, veterans benefits appeals constituted 138 (or 8.08%) of

the total 1,708 Federal Circuit filings. See ANNUAL REPORT AI-43 app. I, tbl. B-8
(1993). Veterans benefits filings in 1994 dropped to 118 (or 6.92%) of the total
1,705 appeals filed. See ANNUAL REPORT AI-43 app. I, tbl. B-8 (1994). In 1995, that
figure dropped again, to 75 (or 4.06%) of the total 1,847 appeals filed in the Federal
Circuit. STATISTICS DIVISION, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS,
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 1995 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 127

app. I, tbl. B-8 (1995). In 1996, parties seeking veterans benefits made up 59 (or
4.41%) of the total 1,337 appeals filed in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit. STATISTICS DIVISION, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS,
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 1996 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 124
app. I, tbl. B-8 (1996) [hereinafter 1996 REPORT].
15. STATISTICS DIVISION, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS,
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another forty-five percent increase in 1998,6 and an additional fiftynine percent increase in 1999.17 During the same period, the total
filings in the Federal Circuit remained relatively constant, averaging
around 1,500 per year.' 8 Therefore, veterans benefits cases increased,
in a three-year span, from representing approximately four percent
of the total number of appeals filed in the Federal Circuit to
representing approximately twelve percent. 19
In 2000, Congress enacted the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of
2000 ("VCAA"),20 effectuating the most comprehensive legislative
change in veterans benefits law since the Veterans' Judicial Review
Act in 1988. The VCAA both reaffirmed and broadened the agency's
duties to assist and inform claimants for veterans benefits.2' In
particular, the VCAA eliminated the "well grounded claim"
requirement.2 Courts had interpreted the Veterans Judicial Review
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 1997 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 117
app. I, tbl. B-8 (1997) [hereinafter 1997 REPORT] (showing 84 (or 5.76%) veterans

benefits appeals filed among total 1,458 filings in Federal Circuit). Eighty-four filings
in 1997 represents a 42% increase over the 59 veterans benefits appeals filed in 1996.
See 1996 REPORT, supranote 14.
16. STATISTICS DIVISION, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS,
JUDICIAL BuSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 1998 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 131

app. I, tbl. B-8 (1998) [hereinafter 1998 REPORT] (indicating that of 1,454 claims
filed in the Federal Circuit in 1998, 122 (or 8.39%) were veterans benefits appeals).
This constitutes a 45% rise since 1997 in the number of cases actually filed and
appealed from the CAVC. See 1997 REPORT, supranote 15.
17. See STATISTICS DIVISION, ADmINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS,
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 1999 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 125

app. I, tbl. B-8 (1999) [hereinafter 1999 REPORT] (discussing appeals filed,
terminated, and pending in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit for a
twelve-month period ending September 30, 1999, and citing 194 (or 12.57%)
veterans benefits appeals raised among a total 1,543 filings in Federal Circuit). The
1999 figure represents a 59% increase over the 122 veterans benefits appeals filed in
1998. See 1998 REPORT, supra note 16. But see STATISTICS DIVISION, ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS: 2000 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 119 app. I, tbl. B-8 (2000) (noting that

veterans benefits appeals comprised 186 (or 12.33%) of 1,509 total filings in the
Federal Circuit in 2000). Whereas 194 veterans benefits appeals were filed in the
Federal Circuit in 1999, only 186 were similarly filed in 2000, thus constituting a 4%
decrease in the number of claims on appeal from the CAVC at the end of 2000 as
opposed to 1999. See 1999 REPORT, supranote 17.
18. See 1997 REPORT, supra note 15 (noting 1,458 total filings in the Federal
Circuit in 1997); 1998 REPORT, supra note 16 (1,454 total filings in 1998); 1999
REPORT, supra note 17 (1,543 total filings in 1999).
19. Compare 1996 REPORT, supra note 14 (indicating that veterans benefits appeals
in 1996 constituted 4.41% of the total number of cases filed in the Federal Circuit),
with 1999 REPORT, supra note 17 (showing that 12.57% of all appeals filed in the
Federal Circuit in 1999 derived from the CAVC).
20. Pub. L. No. 106-475, 114 Stat. 2096 (Nov. 9, 2000).
21. See id. (stating that the purpose of the Act is to "reaffirm and clarify the duty
of the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to assist claimants for benefits").
22. Compare38 U.S.C. § 5107(a) (1994) (imposing a burden on persons claiming
benefits under the 1988 Veterans' Judicial Review Act to "submit[] evidence [to the
secretary] sufficient to justify a belief by a fair and impartial individual that the claim
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Act as requiring a claimant to submit a "well grounded claim" (a
prima facie case of entitlement to a particular benefit) before the
agency's duty to assist was triggered.2 Because the VCAA eliminated
this requirement, this Article will not discuss in detail Federal Circuit
cases addressing the issue of well groundedness.2 4
II. JURISDICTION, EXHAUSTION, AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Finality
Generally, only final decisions may be reviewed on appeal.n In a
number of decisions, the Federal Circuit addressed finality for the
purpose ofjudicial review.
1. Remands
In several cases, the Federal Circuit has addressed whether a26
remand by the CAVC constitutes a final decision. In Caesarv. West,
the court noted that it does not usually contemplate an order
remanding a case to an administrative agency, such as the Board, as a
final decision for the purposes of establishing jurisdiction because a
remand ordinarily signals a continuation of the case. 27 In Caesar,the
is well grounded"), with Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 § 5107(a) (omitting
the use of the term "well grounded" and requiring claimants only to "present and
support a claim for benefits under laws administered by the Secretary").
23. See, e.g., Epps v. Gober, 126 F.3d 1464, 1468-69 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (analyzing
statutory obligations imposed on the Department of Veterans Affairs and concluding
that the agency has a duty to assist only those claimants who have established "well
grounded" or "plausible" claims); cf. 38 U.S.C. § 5107(a) (1994) ("[A] person who
submits a claim for benefits under a law administered by the Secretary shall have the
burden of submitting evidence... that the claim is well grounded[.]").
24. Several cases in the Federal Circuit specifically address the issue of a
sufficiently well grounded claim. See, e.g., Summers v. Gober, 225 F.3d 1293, 1297
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (upholding the CAVC's denial of a veteran's claim on the ground
that the Board did not err when it refused to assist the veteran because the veteran
did not establish the statutorily-required "well grounded claim"); Nolen v. Gober,
222 F.3d 1356, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding that CAVC misinterpreted statue when
it addressed whether claimant had presented a well grounded claim); Hensley v.
West, 212 F.3d 1255, 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (recognizing that inquiry as to the well
groundedness of a claim carries a "uniquely low" evidentiary threshold); cf Winters v.
Gober, 219 F.3d 1375, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (implicitly addressing the well
groundedness issue, yet vacating and remanding the CAVC's decision on the basis
that the court surpassed its statutory authority by re-questioning the sufficiency of the
veteran's claim and erroneously relying on different reasoning than that utilized by
the Board).
25. See Travelstead v. Derwinski, 978 F.2d 1244, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(conducting statutory analysis to determine when the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction
to review an appeal and concluding that a case is appealable only upon final
judgment).
26. 195 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
27. Id. at 1374.
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claimant did not argue that the CAVC's decision to remand his case
constituted a final order giving the Federal Circuit jurisdiction. 8
Rather, the claimant urged the court to consider the CAVC's decision
as final because it fell within the "collateral order exception."2
Under this exception, a court has jurisdiction to review matters from
a non-final judgment when the "important legal issues [to be raised]
would otherwise become effectively unreviewable" at a later phase in
the litigation." The court, having noted the rarity with which the
collateral order exception applies, 1 outlined the three requirements
for applying the exception in a particular case. First, the order on
appeal "must conclusively determine the question;"3 2 second, the
appealed order "must resolve a significant issue completely separate
from the merits of the action;" 33 and finally, "the order must be
effectively unreviewable from a final judgment in the case."34
The court concluded that the claimant could not take advantage of
the collateral order exception because Caesar's case did not meet the
requisite factors. 5 The court stated first that the issue on appeal,
which turned on a determination of whether Caesar had the
necessary statutory evidence to reopen his claim for service
connection, was "obviously not resolved by the remand decision
below."36 Next, the court explained that Caesar's question as to the
sufficiency of his new and material evidence was clearly intertwined,
and therefore not separate from, his ongoing attempt to be awarded
37
compensation for the injuries he suffered during World War I.
Finally, the court rejected Caesar's invocation of the collateral order
exception because nothing in the CAVC's decision precluded Caesar
from introducing his arguments at a later phase in the dispute. s
In a number of other decisions, however, the Federal Circuit has
held that a CAVC remand was a final decision. In Dambach v. Gober,39
the Federal Circuit held that a remand was a final decision, because
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See id. (reviewing the definition of "collateral order exception" and exploring
appropriate application of the exception).
31. Id. at 1375.
32. Caesar,195 F.3d at 1375.
33. Id. (citation omitted).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See id. (observing that the question raised on appeal was "plainly deeply
intertwined" with ongoing litigation).
38. See Caesar, 195 F.3d at 1375 (ultimately denying Caesar's claim asserting
jurisdiction in the Federal Circuit).
39. 223 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2000).

786
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the CAVC's construction of a statute would alter the evidentiary
burdens in the remand and might make the statutory-construction
determination unrevewable.40
In Allen v. Principi,41 the court
considered a statutory construction argument in a case that the
CAVC had decided to remand.42 The court noted that the CAVC's
interpretation of the statute would have a "clear[] ''43 and
"unquestionabl[e]" 44 effect on the remand proceedings. 45
The
Federal Circuit further determined that it was also possible that it
"would not have the opportunity to review the statutory
interpretation issue later in the litigation."4 6 For these reasons, the
court found that the CAVC's remand order constituted a final
decision, thereby establishing jurisdiction for purposes of the Federal
Circuit's review.
In Adams v. Principi,47 the court concluded that a remand was a final

decision for purposes of appeal.4 8 There, the veteran contended that
the agency failed to offer sufficient proof to overcome the
presumption of sound condition and, consequently, that the CAVC
should have resolved the issue by ruling, rather than remanding, the
case. 49 The Federal Circuit noted that if the claimant was "correct on
the merits that he has a right to judgment without a remand, the
order of the Veterans Court requiring him to undergo a remand
before obtaining appellate relief would defeat the very right he
asserts ... ."50 The court then emphasized that its ruling on the
remand in no way suggests that all future orders from the CAVC shall
be considered appealable to the Federal Circuit. 5' The court clarified
40. See id. at 1379 (rejecting the government's motion to dismiss the case for lack
of final decision and reiterating the position that the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction
when "there is statutory interpretation that will affect the remand proceeding and
that legal issue might evade [the court's] future review").
41.

237 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

42. See id. at 1370 (granting jurisdiction over the CAVC's remand decision
because that court's particular reading of the statute would impact remand
proceedings below as well as to threaten the possibility of future review).
43. Id. at 1373.

44. Id.
45. See id. (characterizing CAVC's interpretation of the statute as "erroneous"
and reasoning that the lower court's statutory reading would certainly affect remand
proceedings below, because it entirely precludes the veteran from making his
argument).
46. Id.
47. 256 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
48. See id. at 1321 (finding it "appropriate" to review the merits of the veteran's
appeal).
49. See id. (describing the veteran's claim on appeal as a dispute over the
propriety of the CAVC's decision to remand case to the Board).
50. Id.
51. See id. (indicating that although the court considered a remand in this case to
constitute final judgment sufficient to confer the Federal Circuit with jurisdiction
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that the remand order was "appealable only because the remand
deprives Mr. Adams of his claimed right to a decision in his favor on
the record as it now stands and might result in that issue becoming
52
moot after further proceedings in the Board of Veterans' Appeals."
Thus, the court's "normal policy" of considering only final judgments
of the court below did not preclude the Federal
Circuit from
53
reviewing Adams's claim in this particular instance.
2. Multiple claims
Veterans benefits appeals before the CAVC frequently involve54
claims for benefits for more than one disability. In Elkins v. Gober,
the court addressed the situation of a CAVC decision that remanded
some claims but not others. The court held that the decision as to
the claims that were not remanded was final, thereby providing it
with jurisdiction to consider them. The court noted that "it would be
unfair to deny the veteran an immediate appeal of a final decision as
to one or more of his claims simply because an additional claim is
remanded for further proceedings."' 5 The court recognized that its
holding "may lead to less efficient use of judicial resources,"56 but
indicated that "[s] uch a result ...is inevitable given the pro-claimant,
nonadversarial, ex parte system that supplies veterans benefits." 57
In Smith v. Gober,5 the claimant prompted the Federal Circuit to
determine "under what circumstances veterans' claims may be
deemed separable for purposes of appeal to this court, so that some
claims may be appealed despite the remand of other claims raised in
the same case." 9 The court held that the claimant's two separate
claims were "sufficiently intertwined that they should be considered
together."' Thus, a decision on one of the claims did not constitute
final judgment for purposes of an appeal, even as to the claim upon
which there had been no judgmen
In so holding, the Federal

over the appeal, the court's "ruling does not imply that all remand orders of the
Veterans Court are appealable" to the Federal Circuit).

52. Id.
53. See id. (settling a dispute in favor of the veteran claimant and noting the

Federal Circuit's jurisdiction to review an appeal after remand to the CAVC).
54. 229 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2000).

55. Id. at 1376.

56. Id.
57. Id.
58. 236 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
59. Id. at 1372.
60. Id.
61. See id. (concluding that "because the underlying facts of the two claims are so
intimately connected... in the interest of judicial economy and avoidance of
piecemeal litigation, they should be appealed together").
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Circuit noted that the relevant question is "whether the two claims
are separate claims, which may be appealed separately, or whether
62
they are parts of the same claim, which must be appealed together."
3. Agency proceduralerrors
In Hayre v. West,63 the Federal Circuit significantly changed the

rules governing finality of agency decisions." Under Veterans Affairs
("VA") statutes, there are two ways to reargue a previously denied
claim. First, a claimant may collaterally attack a prior final decision
by showing that the decision was clearly and unmistakably
erroneous. 65 Second, a claimant may seek to reopen a finally denied
claim by submitting new and material evidence.6
Hayre added a third method that was not based on VA statutes.
The court held that in cases of "grave procedural error, ", 7 such as the
breach of the duty to assist, the agency decision is not final for
purposes of appeali 8 In particular, the court held a breach of the
duty to assist, in which the VA failed to obtain pertinent service
medical records requested by the claimant and failed to provide the
claimant with notice explaining the deficiency, renders a decision
non-final for purposes of appeal.69
The court reasoned that the failure to obtain pertinent service
medical records specifically requested by the claimant and the failure
to provide the claimant with notice explaining the deficiency are
examples of procedural error. 0 Such error is at least comparable to
the failure to notify a claimant of an adverse decision "that vitiates the
finality of a Regional Office decision for purposes of direct appeal."7'
The court noted that regardless of the reason for this neglect, the
lack of notice jeopardizes the interests of the veteran
because it
"extinguishes the claimant's right to judicial review." 72
The Federal Circuit narrowed the scope of Hayre in Cook v.
Principi.73 The court rejected the argument that the failure to give a
62. Id. at 1371-72.
63. 188 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

64. See id. (discussing Hayre's appeal of an order from the CAVC).
65. 38 U.S.C. § 5109A (1994).
66. Id. § 5108.
67. Hayre, 188 F.3d at 1333.

68. Id.
69. Id. at 1334.
70. Id. at 1333.

71.

Id.

72. Id. (explaining that veterans' interests are compromised "[w]hether this lack

of notice is the product of inadvertence or design").
73. 258 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2001). InJanuary 2002, the court granted a petition
to rehear the petition appeal en banc and withdrew its earlier opinion. See Cook v.
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medical examination at the time of the challenged opinion was an
First, the court
error that rendered a decision non-final. 74
emphasized that Hayrewas "an extremely narrow decision." 5 Second,
the court stated that Hayre dealt with "wholly objective issues,,,7 which
included: (1) whether the veteran requested the Regional Office to
obtain his service records; (2) whether the Regional Office made a
second request after the first was not satisfied; and (3) whether it told
the veteran what had happened.7 7 Unlike Hayre, the court in Cook
opined that "the [instant] inquiry involves almost entirely matters of
judgment,"78 as opposed to objective issues.
4.

Notice by agency
The Federal Circuit rejected a number of challenges to the
adequacy of the notice of appellate rights accompanying an agency
Board decision.7'9 For example, the court rejected arguments that the
agency was required to inform claimants about the option of filing a
motion for reconsideration; that claimants may seek legal
representation before the CAVC; and that attorneys fees for an
appeal may be paid by the agency if the agency's position was not
substantially justified.8'
B. Jurisdiction
This section discusses the statutory prerequisites to bring an appeal
before the agency Board, the CAVC, and the Federal Circuit. Issue
exhaustion-the requirement of having raised a particular issue
below-is discussed in the next section.
Board of Veterans'Appeals
Once the Regional Office has rendered a decision regarding a
claim that is adverse to the claimant, the claimant may appeal to the
Board,8 ' which is part of the Department of Veterans Affairs." The
1.

Principi, 275 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
74. See Cook, 258 F.3d at 1312.
75. Id. at 1314 ("[AIlthough the [Hayre] opinion contained some broad
language, the holding was limited....").
76. Id.

77. Id. According to the court, the issues in Hayre "could be answered on the

basis of undisputed objective facts and did not require any exercise ofjudgment." Id.

78. Id.
79. See, e.g., Cummings v. West, 136 F.3d 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that the
notice sent to the claimant was adequate despite the fact that it did not inform the
claimant of her right to appeal within 120 days).
80. Id. at 1472-73.
81. 38 U.S.C. § 7104(a) (providing that all questions in a matter shall be subject
to one review on appeal to the Secretary and final decisions on such appeal shall be

790
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first step in the appeals process is the filing of a timely "Notice of
Disagreement" by the claimant.83 A Notice of Disagreement is "[a]
written communication from a claimant or his or her representative
expressing dissatisfaction with an adjudicative determination by the
agency of original jurisdiction and a desire to contest the result."s'
The claimant must file the Notice of Disagreement within one year of
the agency's mailing of notice of the decision to be appealed.5 The
filing of a timely Notice of Disagreement is a jurisdictional
requirement for obtaining appellate review. 86
The Federal Circuit has addressed the method by which a claimant
must properly raise an issue in a Notice of Disagreement. In Ledford
v. West,8 7 the court noted that while the Notice of Disagreement need
not contain the legal reasoning supporting a challenge to an agency
determination, it "must have indicated disagreement with a specific
determination."'s In Collaro v. West,86 the court held that a "vague"
Notice of Disagreement was sufficient where the claimant later "cut
the rough stone of his [Notice of Disagreement] to reveal the
statutory and constitutional radix of his issue that lay within." 9° The
court noted that, because the Notice of Disagreement was vague, the
claimant had not specifically limited the issue he was appealing. 9'

made by the Board); see also 38 C.F.R. § 20.101 (1999) (outlining the jurisdiction of
the Board).
82. See REPORT OF THE CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF VETERANS' APPEAL., FIscAL YEAR 1999
1 (1999) (explaining the relationship between the Board and the Department of
Veterans Affairs). The DVA administers the laws providing benefits and other
services to veterans and their families. The Board is part of the DVA and is tasked
with reviewing benefits claim determinations made by the Regional Offices and
issues decisions on appeals.
83. See 38 U.S.C. 7105 (1994) (establishing the requirements for filing a Notice
of Disagreement and appeal). Appellate review of a claim is initiated by the filing of
a Notice of Disagreement followed by a statement of the case prepared by the agency
and is completed by a substantive appeal. Id.
84. 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 (1999).
85. See id. § 20.302 ("Except in the case of simultaneously contested claims, a
claimant, or his or her representative, must file a Notice of Disagreement with a
determination by the agency of original jurisdiction within one year from the date
that that agency mails notice of the determination to him or her. ); see also 38 U.S.C.
§ 7105(b) (1) (1994) ("A notice of disagreement postmarked before the expiration of
the one-year period will be accepted as timely filed.").
86. See Veterans' Judicial Review Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-687, § 402, 102 Stat.
4105, 4122 (1988) (codified at 38 U.S.C. § 7105 (1994)) (stating that an agency's
action or determination will become final if a Notice of Disagreement is not filed
within the prescribed period and the claim will not thereafter be reopened except as
otherwise allowed by the regulations).
87. 136 F.3d 776 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
88. Id. at 779.
89. 136 F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
90. Id. at 1309.
91. Id.
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2.

Courtof Appealsfor Veterans Claims
By statute, a claimant has 120 days from the date of the mailing of
notice of a Board decision to file a notice of appeal with the CAVC.9'
In Bailey v. West,93 the court dramatically changed the law governing
the timeliness of appeals to the CAVC by allowing equitable tolling of
the 120-day deadline for filing a notice of appeal. 4 The court
acknowledged that previous opinions implied that the statutory 120day time limit was "mandatory, jurisdictional and not subject to
equitable tolling."9' The court had issued opinions with such
implications in 1991,16 1992, 9' 1994,"3 and 1998.9 The court, however,
reconsidered its prior reasoning and overruled "previous statements
that equitable tolling is unavailable."'09 In a concurrence, Judge
Michel underscored the "limited scope" of this decision and wrote
that the "decision does not decide, nor even purport to address,
whether other tribunals may toll their particular filing deadlines."'01
In Linville v. West, 0 2 the court again considered the issue of the
03
timeliness of a Notice of Appeal from a final decision of the Board.
After the Board denied the claimant's reconsideration motion, and
within 120 days of denial of reconsideration, "but well beyond the
120-day period following the Board's final decision," the claimant
filed a Notice of Appeal with the CAVC.' The court held that the
postmark of the appellant's reconsideration motion within 120 days
92. See38 U.S.C. § 7266(a).
93. 160 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
94. See id. at 1368 (explaining how Bailey, after being denied reopening of his
claim, decided to take issue with the timeliness of his appeal, and ultimately won). See
also BLAcK's LAw DI cIoNARY 560 (7th ed. 1999) (defining equitable tolling as "the
doctrine that the statute of limitations will not bar a claim if the plaintiff, despite
diligent efforts, did not discover the injury until after the limitations period had
expired").
95. Bailey, 160 F.3d at 1368.
96. See Machado v. Derwinski, 928 F.2d 389, 391 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (denying
claimant's appeal as untimely because the statute "plainly makes compliance with the
120-day limit a prerequisite to Veterans Court review and does not authorize the
court to extend that time").
97. See Butler v. Derwinski, 960 F.2d 139, 140-41 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (explaining that
Congress did not empower the Court of Veterans Appeals to extend the statute of
limitations).
98. See Mayer v. Brown, 37 F.3d 618, 619 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (denying an appeal
because the 120-day limitations period cannot be extended or waived).
99. See Cummings v. West, 136 F.3d 1468, 1472 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (rejecting the
argument that the doctrine of equitable tolling should be applied to extend the
filing period).
100. Id.
101. Bailey, 160 F.3d at 1368.
102. 165 F.3d 1382 (Fed.Cir. 1999).
103. In Linville, the claimant filed a motion for reconsideration with the Board
112 days after the Board's final decision. Id. at 1382.
104. Id. at 1383-84.
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after the5 mailing of that notice had tolled the running of that filing
0
period.

3.

FederalCircuit
The Federal Circuit addressed jurisdiction in two cases. In an
attorney discipline case, In re Bailey, 06 the court held that it had
jurisdiction to consider a "free-standing" constitutional issue-an
issue that did not involve a challenge to the interpretation or validity
of a statute or regulation-as long as the other jurisdictional
requirements were met.' ° ' In Leonard v. Gober' °8 however, the court
found that it did not have jurisdiction in a case in which the appellant
filed her appeal one day late. The claimant provided various reasons
for her failure to file on time and requested that the court toll the
statute of limitations.' 9 The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to
consider an equitable tolling argument because the argument
improperly challenged the application of law to facts."
C. Issue Exhaustion
The general rule in appeals from administrative agencies is that the
reviewing court will not consider an issue not raised below."' The
Federal Circuit has considered the application of this general rule to
veterans benefits appeals in a number of cases.
12

Failureto raise an issue before agency
The Federal Circuit has addressed whether a particular issue must
be raised before the agency in order for the CAVC to consider it. In
Maggitt v. West,13 the Federal Circuit considered whether the CAVC
erred in holding that it lacked the authority to hear the claimant's
challenges because he had not presented those issues earlier in the
claims process." 4 The court stated that "to the extent the Veterans
1.

105. Id. at 1386.
106.

182 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

107. Id. at 865.
108. 223 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000).

109. Id. at 1375.

110. Id. at 1375-76.
111.

See generally 2 KENNETH C. DAvIs & RIcHARDJ. PIERCE, JR., ADMNISTRATwE LAW

TREATISE § 15.8, at 341 (3d ed. 1994) (discussing appeals from administrative

agencies).
112. Portions of this Part are adapted from Gary E. O'Connor, Did Decide or Should
Have Decided: Issue Exhaustion and the Veterans Benefits Appeals Process,49 AM. U. L. REV.
1279 (2000).
113. 202 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
114. See id. at 1377 (addressing the question of exhaustion of remedies and noting
that the CAVC held that it lacked the authority to hear the claimant's Administrative
Procedure Act ("APA") challenge because he had not presented the issue earlier).
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Court decision in this case implies that the exhaustion doctrine is
jurisdictional in nature, it is incorrect."'' 5 The court also indicated
that a decision on the exhaustion issue should be "case-specific in
competing interests of the veteran and the
balancing the
'' 6
government.

1

Relying on McCarthy v. Madigan,17 the court reasoned that when
Congress has not clearly mandated the exhaustion of particular
administrative remedies, the exhaustion doctrine is not jurisdictional,
but rather is a matter for the exercise of "sound judicial
discretion ....[t]he exercise of that discretion, requires fashioning
of exhaustion principles in a manner consistent with congressional
intent and any applicable statutory scheme.""8 The Federal Circuit
further noted that the CAVC is "uniquely positioned to balance and
decide the considerations regarding exhaustion in a particular
case"" 9 and that "this case presents the opportunity for the Court of
Appeals for Veterans Claims to articulate the grounds upon which
the exhaustion doctrine should, or should not, be invoked."'' 0
Several aspects of the reasoning in Maggitt, however, were
inconsistent with an earlier decision addressing a similar issue, Ledford
v. West. 2' First, the two opinions are inconsistent as to the issue of
whether the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
applies to veterans benefits cases. The court in Ledford held that the
claimant was required to exhaust administrative remedies.1n The
court stated that "[t]he legislative history provides no basis for us to
conclude that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
does not apply here. '' 23 In Maggitt, where the claimant made
arguments for the first time on appeal that were similar to arguments
made in Ledford,124 the court noted that "it is open to question
whether application of an exhaustion requirement is consistent with
the statutory purposes underlying the veterans benefits laws ....
Second, the decisions are inconsistent regarding the exceptions to
the exhaustion doctrine. In Ledford, the court rejected the claimant's
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1378.
117. 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992).
118. Id. (quoting McCarthy,503 U.S. at 144).
119. Id. at 1378.
120. Id.
121. 136 F.3d 776 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
122. See id. at 780-82 (concluding that there is no legal basis for suspending
application of the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies in veterans benefits cases).
123. Id. at 782.
124. See Maggit, 202 F.3d at 1377 (challenging the CAVC summary adjudication of
whether exhaustion is required in the circumstances of the case).
125. Id. at 1378.
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argument that exhaustion was not required because the Board did
not have the power to invalidate the circular he challenged. 26 The
court noted that "[a] lack of agency power to provide a remedy
concerning issues beyond its charter does not necessarily relieve a
claimant from presenting those issues as part of a challenge to an
agency decision.' 27 In Maggitt, however, the court indicated that if
there is "'some doubt as to whether the agency was empowered to
grant effective relief," 2 1 the doctrine should not be invoked.'2
2. Failureto timely raise an issue before CA VC
a. Issue raisedbefore CA VC, but not in principalbrief
In Carbino v. West,'2 0 the Federal Circuit addressed whether failure
to raise an argument in a principal brief before the CAVC results in
waiver of that argument. The CAVC had declined to consider an
argument regarding the effect of an internal agency manual, which
was cited and relied upon for the first time in a reply brief.2 ' The
Federal Circuit concluded that the CAVC was correct in declining to
hear the veteran's untimely contentions.12 The court noted that
"[a]n improper or late presentation of an issue or argument under
the court's rules need not be considered and, in fact, ordinarily
should not be considered." 133 The court reasoned that there were
"cogent reasons for not permitting an appellant to raise issues or
arguments in a reply brief."' 4 These reasons include the "unfairness
to the appellee who does not have an opportunity to respond and the
added burden on the court that a contrary practice would entail." 135

126. See Ledford, 136 F.3d at 780 (stating that "[claimant's] assertion that the
agency cannot invalidate the circular does not relieve him of the obligation of
presenting his constitutional and APA challenges to the agency.").
127. Id.
128. Maggitt, 202 F.3d at 1377 (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 146-48

(1992)).
129. See id. (discussing "three broad sets of circumstances" where it is

inappropriate to invoke the doctrine against an individual).
130. 168 F.3d 32 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

131. See id. at 33 (stating that the "sole issue on appeal is whether the [CAVC]
erred as a matter of law when it declined to consider the effect of [the] internal
manual").
132. See id. at 35 (explaining that because the statutory language requires the
CAVC to decide legal issues "when presented," suggesting "the compelling precedent
that appellate courts should not consider issue [s] raised for the first time in a reply
brief," the CAVC properly declined to consider the issue).
133. Id. at 34.

134. Id.
135.

Id. at 35.
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Issue not raisedbefore CAVC

In Boggs v. West,13 6 the Federal Circuit held that where a claimant
did not raise a statutory construction argument before the CAVC, it
would not consider the argument in the first instance.' 37 The court
reasoned that although the relevant jurisdictional statute might give
it jurisdiction to consider the argument, it did not require the court
"to decide an issue that has been waived.""' This was especially true
in light of a statute13 governing the right of appeal that contained the
qualifying language "that was relied on below." 14° The court
concluded that "Boggs has no statutory right of appeal on an issue
that was not raised and relied on below.",14 Judge Newman dissented,
arguing that the court should have considered the issue.4
In Smith v. West,"1' the court again refused to consider statutory
construction and due process claims that were not raised before the
CAVC. 14' The court noted that "[a]n appellant who has not settled
on an appealable issue until he or she reaches this court has thus
missed the train."" The court stated that its jurisdictional statute 6
was a bar to consideration of a legal issue or argument (one directed
to the validity of a statute or regulation) on appeal absent one of two
conditions. "47 These conditions are: (1) the CAVC addressed the
issue or argument, or (2) the issue or argument was raised by a party
to the CAVC.148

136. 188 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
137. See id. at 1338 (stating that the proper forum in which Boggs should have
raised his argument concerning the interpretation of the statute at issue was the
CAVC, and denying consideration of the issue).
138. Id.
139. See 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a) (1994) (providing that any party to the case may
obtain a review of the decision regarding the validity of or interpretation of a statute
or regulation that was used to make the decision).
140. Boggs, 188 F.3d at 1338 (explaining that the present court is not required to
hear issues that have been waived by the court below).
141. Id.
142. See id. at 1339 (Newman, J., dissenting) (contending that the court is
permitted, and further obligated, to consider Boggs' argument).
143. 214 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2000). In an April 2002 en banc opinion, the
Federal Circuit modified this opinion. See infra note 156.
144. See id. at 1334 (concluding that the court cannot address issues that were not
presented to the court below).
145. Id. at 1333.
146. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a) (1994).
147. See Smith, 214 F.3d at 1333 (explaining that the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction
is limited to issues raised in the lower court).
148. See id. (explaining that compliance with the jurisdictional statute requires
that the issue of validity of interpretation raised on appeal was either relied on by the
lower court or brought to the attention of the lower court).
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Additionally, in Belcher v. West, 149 the court refused to consider a
regulatory construction argument that was not raised before the
CAVC. Adhering to its holdings in Boggs and Smith, the court
reasoned that "where the [CAVC] neither addresses a legal issue nor
has such an issue presented to it, that court cannot be said to have
'relied on' the issue or argument in 'making its decision.""
The
court concluded that because the claimant's issue was not presented
5
to the CAVC, it did not have jurisdiction to hear that argument.1'
In Forshey v. Gober,5 2 however, the court did consider an issue raised
for the first time on appeal. The issue was the proper evidentiary
standard for determining whether a certain statutory presumption
had been rebutted."' The court noted that "[w]e generally refrain
from examining questions not raised below, but under certain
circumstances, it is appropriate.' 5 4 The "appropriate circumstances"
include: "the issue is one of pure law; the proper resolution is beyond
all doubt; there was no opportunity to raise the objection below; it is
a significant question of general impact or public concern; or it is in
the interest of substantial justice.',5 5 The court noted that "[o]f signal
importance" was the "greater latitude
accorded claimants in informal
5 6
and nonadversarial proceedings."
D. Fact Questions and the Standard of Review
In discussing the review of the Board's decisions by the Article I
court-the CAVC-the Federal Circuit has emphasized their
respective roles in the veterans benefits claims and appeals process.
In particular, the court has noted that it is the Board's role to make
factual findings. '7
149. 214 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2000). In an April 2002 en banc opinion, the
Federal Circuit modified this opinion. See infranote 156.
150. Id. at 1337.
151. See id. (refusing to hear claimant's argument because it was not first
addressed by the CAVC).
152. 226 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
153. See id. at 1305 (considering the appropriate standard of proof for the
statutory presumption at issue).
154. Id. at 1302 (citing Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121 (1976)).
155. Id. at 1302-03.
156. Id. at 1303. In February 2001, the court granted a petition to hear an appeal
en banc, ordering the parties to brief, inter alia, whether Smith and Belchershould be
overruled, and withdrew its earlier opinion. See Forshey v. Principi, 239 F.3d 1224
(Fed. Cir. 2001). The court issued its en banc opinion in April 2002. See Forshey v.
Principi, 284 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that "even when jurisdiction exists,
prudential considerations should severely limit the exercise of our authority to
consider issues not raised or decided below."). The court also modified it opinions
in Smith and Belcher to the extent, if any, that they are inconsistent with this new
approach on jurisdictional issues. Id. at 1342-48.
157. See Elkins v. Gober, 229 F.3d 1369, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("Fact-finding in
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The Federal Circuit has also addressed the standard of review
applicable to the CAVC's review of the Board's factual findings. In
reviewing factual questions, the CAVC frequently states that it will
affirm the agency's finding if there is a "plausible basis" in the record
for the Board's finding. 158 In Sanchez-Benitez v. Principi59 the veteran
argued that the "plausible basis" standard of review was a
misapplication of the statutory "clearly erroneous" standard.',,
The Federal Circuit noted that the Supreme Court's interpretation
of the term "clearly erroneous," for the purposes of review of a lower
court's fact-finding, was "an analogous situation to the Veterans
Court's review of a Board decision ....
In Anderson v. City of
Bessemer City, the Supreme Court stated that "the meaning of the
phrase 'clearly erroneous' is not immediately apparent."1 62 The
foremost principle governing the standard is as follows: "A finding is
'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed."6 ' The Federal
Circuit found the CAVC's reliance on the Board's decision was wellsupported, based on the record on appeal, the appellant's original
and reply briefs, the Secretary's brief, and the parties' oral
arguments.!" Therefore, the CAVC's "conclusion that there was a
'plausible basis in the record for the Board's decision' was [not] a
misapplication of the 'clearly erroneous' standard of review." 6 5
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

A. Due Process
The Federal Circuit considered a procedural due process challenge
veterans cases is to be done by the expert BVA, not by the Veterans Court."); Winters
v. Gober, 219 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("The Court of Appeals for Veterans
Claims' attempts to address the well-groundedness of the claim may also have
required it to make improper de novo findings of fact."); Hensley v. West, 212 F.3d
1255, 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (noting "the general rule that appellate tribunals are not
appropriate fora for initial fact-finding.").
158. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Denvinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 53 (1990) (explaining that
under the "clearly erroneous" standard, the court cannot substitute its factual
judgments for that of the BVA).
159. 259 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
160. See 38 U.S.C. § 7261 (a) (4) (1994) (codifying the idea that the CAVC should
set aside the agency's finding if the finding is clearly erroneous).
161. Sanchez-Benitez, 259 F.3d at 1360.
162. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985).
163. Id. at 573 (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364,
395 (1948)).
164. Sanchez-Benitez, 259 F.3d at 1361.
165. Id. at 1361 (citations omitted).
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in Richard v. West.' 66 In Richard, the claimant argued that any
construction of any provision under Title 38 of the United States
Code "that compels a conclusion that a veteran's claim to disability
compensation terminates at death [would] bring the statute into
conflict with the constitutional requirement of procedural due
process. "0 67 The court noted that to raise a due process question, a
claimant has to demonstrate a protected property interest in such
protections.'6 Under VA statutes, a veteran's claim is terminated
upon the veteran's death; therefore the property interest also
terminates and a veteran's estate does not have a protected property
interest in such compensation. 169
In Jackson v. Principi,70 the court rejected a veteran's argument that
he was unfairly prejudiced when the Board considered the71 issue of
new and material evidence without providing notice to him.
The court recognized that, in Nolen v. Gober,12 it had stated that
fundamental principles of fairness were implicated when the CAVC
decided an issue that neither party raised and about which neither
party had notice. 173 The court reasoned, however, that "the general
principles of fairness that we found consistent with the statutory
scheme in Nolen [could] not compel a procedure that conflicts with
the statutory scheme that authorizes the Board to make all final
decisions on behalf of the Secretary that are necessary to a
decision." 74 The court further distinguished Nolen on the ground
that "[t] he fairness issues relating to an adversarial proceeding before
an independent court that were important in Nolen [are] not
implicated when the appeal is to the Board, where the Secretary is
asked to re-examine the Regional Office's decision and decide the
proper disposition of the veteran's claim."' 75 The court also noted
that "[t] he issue of whether Mr. Jackson's evidence justified a ruling
in his favor on the merits, which he addressed in his appeal before
166. 161 F.3d 719 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
167. Id. at 723.

168. Id.
169. See id. (explaining that property interests are defined by existing rules and
understandings, and because a veteran's claim to disability compensation terminates
at death under Title 38, a veteran does not have a protected property interest arising
from existing rules or understandings).

170. 265 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

171. See id. at 1371 (rejecting claimant's contention that the Board's procedure
violated his due process rights).
172. 222 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
173. See id. at 1360-61 (noting that such a result would have been a "complete
surprise" to claimant, who had no chance to directly address the issue in question).
174. Jackson, 265 F.3d at 1370.

175. Id.

2002]

1998-2001 VETERANS BENEFITS DECISIONS

799

the Board, largely overlapped with the issue of whether the evidence
he offered to the Regional Office was new and material." 176 Thus, the
court rejected the argument that the procedure followed by the
Board violatedJackson's due process rights.
B.

Vagueness and Overbreadth

The Federal Circuit has also considered vagueness challenges. In
Yeoman v. West, 77 the court held that agency regulations regarding
willfull misconduct were not unconstitutionally vague.17 The court
noted that the "vagueness doctrine does not require that regulations
achieve near mathematical certainty,"'79 and that "statutes and
regulations must necessarily be written in such a way as to be able ' to
18
'deal with untold and unforeseen variations in factual situations." 0
The court concluded that a claimant's consumption of six to eight
beers and lack of sleep for approximately forty-five hours prior to an
automobile accident constituted willful misconduct.18 1 The court
reasoned that the regulations were "sufficiently articulated" that an
ordinary service member "could understand and comply with them
through the exercise of ordinary common sense.' 82
In Lofton v. WestYrs the Federal Circuit addressed an agency
regulation barring benefits to "[a]ny person who has intentionally
and wrongfully caused the death of another person,"' 84 and found the
regulation was not impermissibly overbroad or vague.""
The
claimant's primary argument was that the regulation failed to define
the terms "intentionally" or "wrongfully" and thus could pertain to all
situations in which the claimant caused the veteran's death.' 8 The
court noted that terms such as "intentionally" and "wrongfully" are
frequently used in the law without further definition.'87 The court
176. Id. at 1370-71.
177. 140 F.3d 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
178. See id. at 1448 (addressing the claimant-appellant's final argument that the
Department of Veteran Affairs regulations concerning willful misconduct were
unconstitutionally vague and should be void because they did not provide fair notice
as to what actions preclude a veteran from receiving benefits).
179. Id.
180. Id. (quoting Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337 (1952)).
181. See id. (concluding that any "ordinary service member" should understand
that a person cannot drive for so long after so much alcohol and so little sleep
without committing willful misconduct).
182. Id.
183. 198 F.3d 846 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
184. 38 C.F.R. § 3.11 (2001).
185. Lofton, 198 F.3d at 850-51.
186. Id. at 850.
187. See id. (noting the frequency of the use of the two words "intentionally" and
.wrongfully," and failing to find these words unconstitutional).

800
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indicated that it examines vagueness challenges in light of the facts of
the case if First Amendment rights are not invoked)8 The court
noted that, on her guilty plea, Ms. Lofton was convicted of the crime
of voluntary manslaughter.'8 9
Thus, her conviction lawfully
established that she intentionally and wrongfully killed her
husband.' 90
Ms. Lofton also argued that the regulation was overbroad because
it could prohibit the payment of benefits to a surviving spouse that
mistook her husband for a burglar and mistakenly shot and killed
him.' 9' The court rejected that argument, noting that "the fact that
close cases may arise under the regulation does not render the
regulation invalid in cases such as this one that are not close.' 92 The
court further opined that the overbreadth doctrine applies when
constitutional rights are at stake, but is inapplicable
in cases that
193
involve only a statutory claim for financial benefits.
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE-LAW ISSUES
Appeals of adverse decisions regarding veterans' benefits begin in a
federal administrative agency; therefore, a number
of Federal Circuit
94
decisions discuss administrative-law principles.
A. Challenging Validity of Regulations in the FederalCircuit
VA statutes allow parties to challenge the validity of regulations in

188. Id.
189. See id. at 847 (detailing the procedural posture of the criminal litigation that
arose from the death of Ms. Lofton's former husband). Ms. Lofton was originally
convicted of second degree murder. Id. That charge was reversed on a jury
instruction error and Ms. Lofton subsequently pled guilty to a voluntary
manslaughter charge. Id. Ms. Lofton was sentenced to ten years imprisonment as a
result. Id.
190. See id. at 857.
191. Id.
192. Id. (dismissing the applicability of§ 3.11 to a defense of mistake case because
this type of case lacks the "wrongfully" element of the regulation).
193. Id. (citations omitted).
194. See E. Paralyzed Veterans Ass'n v. Principi, 257 F.3d 1352, 1364 (Fed. Cir.
2001) ("An agency directive is not subject to the notice and comment requirements
of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994), and may be modified or
rescinded at any time."); Disabled Am. Veterans v. Gober, 234 F.3d 682, 690 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (holding that an action for judicial review of an agency rule or regulation
must be filed within sixty days of the issuance of the rule or regulation); Mortgage
Investors Corp. v. Gober, 220 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (stating that to
determine if an agency action is arbitrary or capricious, the court must examine
whether the agency considered relevant factors or clearly erred in its judgment);
Splane v. West, 216 F.3d 1058, 1063 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (distinguishing between
substantive and interpretive rules); Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. West, 138 F.3d 1434,
1436 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (same).
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the Federal Circuit.' 95 The Federal Circuit has held, based on its own
court rules, that such challenges must be brought within sixty days
after the issuance of the rule or regulation at issue.'96 The court held
that "issuance" means the date that the rule becomes effective, not
the date of publication. 97 Further, the court held that a veterans
organization had associational standing to challenge the rules.9 3 The
Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") standard of review of agency
rules is highly deferential to the actions of the agency.'99
The Federal Circuit has considered challenges to various agency
rules. In Mortgage Investors Corp. v. Gober, °' the court concluded that a
modification of an agency rule regarding the loan guaranty program
9
was not arbitrary and capricious.Y
' By statute, the agency can
guarantee a percentage of a veteran's private mortgage loan. 2 2 An
agency program continues that guarantee in situations when the
veteran refinances the loan to obtain a lower interest rate.
In the
past, refinancing required no agency review or approval if the
original loan was not more than three payments past due."' The
modified rule clarified that the veteran could not skip any monthly
loan payments before the refinancing, and effectively converted the
three-payment grace period into a one-payment grace period.29 ' The
court noted that "[i]n an informal rule-making procedure such as
this, the agency need only supply a record adequate to show
compliance with APA requirements."2" The court concluded that the
agency's record was adequate and complied with APA procedures.0 7
The Federal Circuit examined regulations implementing the
Veterans' Health Care Eligibility Reform Act of 1996 in Eastern
2°
Paralyzed Veterans Association, Inc. v. Principi,
0 ultimately rejecting the
195. See 38 U.S.C. § 502 (1994) (stating that an action by the Secretary is subject to
judicial review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit).
196. Disabled Am. Veterans v. Gober, 234 F.3d 682, 690 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
197. Id. at 690-91.
198. Id. at 689-90.
199. Id. at 691.
200. 220 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
201. See id. at 1381 ("Therefore, this court finds the new rule to be not arbitrary
and capricious, and DVA to have followed the APA's procedural requirements in

adopting it.").
202. See 38 U.S.C. § 3703(a) (1) (A) (1994) ('Any loan to a veteran eligible for
benefits... is automatically guaranteed by the United States ....
").
203. See Mortgage Investors Corp., 220 F.3d at 1376 (discussing the Interest Rate
Reduction Refinancing Loan program initiated by the Department of Veteran
Affairs).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1377.
206. Id. at 1380.
207. Id.
208. 257 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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challenges to the regulations." 9 In a concurrence, Circuit Judge
Gajarsa emphasized that the decision upheld the constitutionality of
the regulations on their face, not in their application.210
In National Organization of Veteran's Advocates v. Principi,211 the
Federal Circuit considered challenges to the validity of regulatory
changes to a dependency and indemnity compensation ("DIC")
regulation.
The court noted that two agency regulations
interpreted
nearly
identical language in two different statutes
•
213
inconsistently.
The court directed the agency to conduct an
expedited rulemaking in which the agency would either "provide a
reasonable explanation" for its decision to interpret the statutes
"in
214
inconsistent ways," or revise the regulations to be consistent.
B. Substantive Rules
The Administrative Procedure Act 15 requires agencies to publish
certain rules.216 According to the Act, agencies must publish: rules of
procedure; substantive rules of general applicability adopted as
authorized by law; statements of general policy; interpretations of
general applicability formulated and adopted by the agency; and
each amendment, revision, or repeal of such a rule.217
In a number of cases, the Federal Circuit has addressed whether a
particular rule is "substantive" (or "legislative"), in an effort to
determine whether the rule is subject to APA publication
requirements. In Paralyzed Veterans of America v. West,218 the Federal
Circuit rejected the argument that the agency erred in failing to
follow APA notice and comment procedures in repealing a
1

209. See id. at 1354 (rejecting the notion that the regulations implementing the
Veterans' Health Care Eligibility Reform Act of 1996 deny veterans due process, are
inconsistent with the Act, and are arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion).
210. Id. at 1363 (Gajarsa,J., concurring).
211. 260 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
212. See id. at 1367 (stating that the regulation restricts the award of DIC benefits
to certain survivors of deceased veterans).
213. See id. at 1368 (finding that the revised regulation is inconsistent with the way

that 38 C.F.R. § 20.1106 interprets 38 U.S.C. § 1311(a)(2), a strikingly similar
veterans benefit statute).
214. See id. at 1380-81 (instructing the DVA to either provide a reasonable
explanation as to why it made the decision to interpret sections 1311 and 1318
inconsistently or to revise 38 C.F.R. § 3.22 to harmonize that regulation with the
court's interpretation of 38 C.F.R. § 20.1106).

215. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994).
216. See Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. West, 138 F.3d 1434, 1436 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(quoting the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994), to state that
proposed rules must be published in the Federal Register).

See id.
217.
218. 138 F.3d 1434 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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regulation. 9 The court noted that case law has defined "substantive
rules" as those that effect a change in existing law or policy, or that
affect individual rights and obligations. 220 "Interpretative rules," on
the other hand, clarify or explain existing law or regulations and are
exempt from notice and comment requirements under the APA.22'
The court quoted the D.C. Circuit's explanation: "[A]n interpretative
statement simply indicates an agency's reading of a statute or a rule.
It does not intend to create new rights or duties, but only reminds
affected parties of existing duties." 222 The court concluded that the
repeal was not a "substantive change," reasoning
that the regulation
22
simply clarified and explained existing law.
In Splane v. West,224 the Federal Circuit considered whether an

agency general counsel opinion was a substantive rule or an
interpretive rule within the meaning of the APA and the Freedom of
Information Act. 25 The court concluded that the general counsel

opinion was interpretive because it was "the agency's reading of the
statutes and rules rather than an attempt to make new law or modify
existing law." 2
22 7
Finally, in National Organization of Veterans' Advocates v. Prinipi,
the Federal Circuit determined that changes to a regulation
appearing in the Code of Federal Regulations were interpretive and
thus were not invalid for failure to comply with notice and comment
procedures.ns The court rejected the argument that the changes
were substantive because they modified existing law, namely, various
decisions of the CAVC interpreting the regulation. 229 The court

219. Id. at 1436 (stating that the DVA did not have to provide advance public
notice and a comment period before its repeal of 38 C.F.R. § 3.101 because it was an
interpretive rule, rather than a substantive rule).
220. Id. (citing Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 927 (Fed. Cir.
1991)).
221. Id. (citing Animal Legal Defense Fund,932 F.2d at 927).
222. Id. (quoting Orengo Caraballo v. Reich, 11 F.3d 186, 195 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(citations omitted)).
223. Paralyzed Veterans ofAm., 138 F.3d at 1436.
224. 216 F.3d 1058 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
225. See id. at 1063 (noting that the court was using the APA and FOIA as
guidance in its decision making); 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994).
226. Id.
227. 260 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
228. See id. at 1377 (finding that 38 C.F.R. § 3.22 clarifies the agency's earlier
interpretation of 38 U.S.C. § 1318, is therefore interpretive, and thus is not subject to
the notice and comment requirements of the APA).
229. See id. at 1375-76 (rejecting the petitioner's argument that three cases
decided by the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, Green v. Brown, 10 Vet. App.
111 (1997), Wingo v. West, 11 Vet. App. 307 (1998), and Carpenterv.West, 11 Vet. App.
140 (1998), are directly analogous to the National Association of Veterans' Advocates
case).
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reasoned that past CAVC decisions rested in large part on the
interpretation of an earlier version of the regulation. 230 Furthermore,
the agency promulgated the regulatory changes to make clear that
those decisions did not accurately reflect the agency's intention in
issuing the regulation. 23' Thus, the revisions "merely clarified the
Department of Veterans' Affairs interpretation." 232 Moreover, "a rule
that does no more than clarify the interpretation of a statute is
necessarily interpretive in character, even233if that interpretation has
consequences for the rights of the parties."
C. Presumptionof AdministrativeRegularity
The Federal Circuit has applied the presumption of administrative
regularity in a number of veterans benefits appeals. In Gonzales v.
West,m the court considered a regulation requiring certain agency
determinations to be "based on 'review' of the 'entire evidence' of
record .... 2 35 The court concluded that, absent specific evidence
indicating otherwise, "all evidence contained in the record at the
time of the Regional Office's determination of the service connection
must be presumed to have been reviewed by the Department
of
2 36
Veterans Affairs, and no further proof of such review is needed."
In Pierce v. Principi, 37 the court applied this presumption to the

issue of whether an agency Regional Office had made a required
finding in reaching its decision. 23

In Butler v. Principi,239 the court

held that the presumption of administrative regularity applied to the
mailing of a copy of a notice of appeal rights to a veteran."
D. Deference to Agency Rules (Chevron)
The Federal Circuit has indicated that the agency has substantive
rule-making power with respect to veterans benefits and thus
Chevron 4 deference applies.242 Under the Chevron analysis, the court
230. See id. at 1375-76 (noting that a previous version of the regulation had been
in effect during the litigation of these cases on which the petitioners rely).

231. Nat'l Org. of Veteran's Advocates v. West, 260 F.3d 1365, 1375-76 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (distinguishing Green, Wingo, and Carpenter).
232. Id. at 1376.

233. Id.
234. 218 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2000).

235. Id. at 1380.
236. Id. at 1381.
237. 240 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
238. See id. at 1355-56 (noting that at the time of the original rating, a Regional

Office
239.
240.
241.

was not required to set forth findings of fact in its decision).
244 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
Id. at 1355-56.
Id.
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reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it administers,
and thereafter confronts two questions.243 The first question is
whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue.244 If congressional intent is clear, the court-as well as the
agency-must effectuate the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress.2 If, however, Congress has not directly addressed the
precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own
construction on the statute, as it otherwise would in the absence of an
administrative interpretation.246 Rather, if the statute is silent or
ambiguous regarding the specific issue, the court inquires whether
the agency's
answer is based on a permissible construction of the
247
statute.
Thus, the agency may fill a "gap" left by the statute. 24 The Federal
Circuit has indicated that "[a] regulation does not contradict the
statutory scheme, however, simply because it addresses an issue on
which the scheme is silent., 249 As long as the regulation constitutes a
reasonable "gap-filling" measure, the agency "may promulgate such a
regulation without violating its statutory mandate. ' u' °
In addition, the agency may resolve ambiguities of interpretation
left by Congress as long as the agency's action is reasonable and
consistent in light of the statute and congressional intent.2l Courts

modify the traditional Chevron analysis when interpreting ambiguities
in veterans' benefit statutes, concluding that "interpretative doubt is
to be resolved in the veteran's favor. " 2 2 As noted below, this doctrine
of resolving ambiguities in the veteran's favor has limits.
In addition, agency interpretations that do not result from formal
adjudications or notice-and-comment rulemaking "do not warrant
Chevron-style deference. ''u 3 Courts grant some deference to such
242. Id. at 1356.
243. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
244. Id. at 842.
245. Id. at 842-43.
246. Id. at 843.
247. See Meeks v. West, 216 F.3d 1363, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("If a statute is silent
or ambiguous about a matter, the court gives deference to interpretations of the
agency charged with the duty to administer it.").
248. See Disabled Am. Veterans v. Gober, 234 F.3d 682, 691 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("An
agency that has been granted authority to promulgate regulations necessary to the
administration of a program it oversees may fill gaps in the statutory scheme left by
Congress.") (quoting Contreras v. United States, 215 F.3d 1267, 1274 (Fed. Cir.
2000)).
249. Lofton v. West, 198 F.3d 846, 850 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
250. Id. at 850 (citing Gilpin v. West, 155 F.3d 1353, 1355-56 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
251. DisabledAm. Veterans, 234 F.3d at 691 (citing Gilpin, 155 F.3d at 1355-56).
252. Id. at 692 (quoting Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994)).
253. Natl Org. of Veterans' Advocates v. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs, 260 F.3d 1365,
1378 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (quoting Christenson v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587
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interpretations, however, given the Department of Veterans Affairs'
"specialized experience" and the "broader investigations and
information" available to that agency.2 4 The degree of deference
depends on the interpretation's "power to persuade. ' 'ns
E. Affirming an Agency Decision on a Different Ground (Chenery)
The Federal Circuit has addressed the application of SEC v.
CheneryZ6 to veterans benefits appeals. Chenery stands for the principle
that a reviewing court generally should not decide a case on a ground
not relied on by the agency.u? The court noted in Fleshman v. West
that the Cheneiy doctrine "is not applied inflexibly.",Z8 Reviewing
courts may affirm an agency decision on a ground different from the
one used by the agency if the new ground does not demand "a
determination or judgment which an administrative agency alone is
authorized to make. ''n 9
The court further explained that the Chenery doctrine does not
require a remand to the agency if it is clear that "the agency would
have reached the same ultimate result" had it considered the new
ground. 260 Thus, the court rejected the claimant's argument that the
case should be remanded for the agency to consider the issue in the
. •
[]
.
261
first instance.
V.

OTHER FEDERAL DISABILITY BENEFITS SCHEMES

Sometimes analogies are drawn between Social Security disability
benefits and veterans benefits. This is not surprising, because both
are federal benefits schemes premised on a claimant's disability. For
example, at oral argument before the Supreme Court in Sims v.
Apfel,262 a case addressing issue exhaustion in a Social Security benefits
appeal, veterans benefits were mentioned a number of times. 63
(2000)).
254. Id. (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944)).
255. Id.
256. 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943) ("The grounds upon which an administrative order
must be judged are those upon which the record discloses that its action was
based."); see also Winters v. Gober, 219 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing
Fleshman as "recognizing the potential application of the Chenery doctrine to the
Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims.").
257. Chenery, 318 U.S. at 87.
258. Fleshman v. West, 138 F.3d 1429, 1433 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
259. Id.
260. Id. (quoting Ward v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd., 981 F.2d 521, 528 (Fed. Cir.
1992)).
261. Id.
262. 530 U.S. 103 (2000).
263. Appellant's Oral Argument at 8-9, Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103 (2000) (No. 989537).
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Recenty, an administrative law scholar proposed replacing the
current veterans benefits appeals system with the Social Security
benefits appeals system.'
In Hodge v. West,265 discussed below, the Federal Circuit criticized
the CAVC for using a test derived from Social Security cases.266 In
Social Security cases, courts apply the "treating physician" rule.267
Under that rule, the opinion of the claimant's physician on the
subject of disability is "binding on the factfinder unless contradicted
by some substantial evidence" and is "entitled to some extra
weight. " s The courts designed the rule to address the situation in
conflicts with the
which a claimant's treating physician's diagnosis
27
69 In White v. Prinipi,
0
physician.
consulting
agency's
the
of
diagnosis
the Federal Circuit rejected the argument that the "benefit of the
doubt" statute requires adoption of the "treating physician" rule in
VA cases.27'
VI. CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES AND REGULATIONS

The Federal Circuit has discussed statutory and regulatory
construction principles in a number of cases. Given its narrow scope
272.
of review, its approach to statutory construction issues is particularly
important in veterans benefits appeals.
A.

General Canons of Construction

In construing statutes, the court tries to give effect to Congress'
intent2 3 In determining intent, the court uses the "traditional tools
of statutory construction; '27 4 examines the statute's text, structure,
264. SeeJames O'Reilly, Burying Caesar: Replacement of the Veteran Appeals Process is
Needed to ProvideFairnessto Claimants, 53 ADMIN. L. REv. 223, 255 (2001) (contending
that the VA system sometimes "ignores" and "evades" the law); see also Gary
O'Connor, Rendering to Caesar:A Response to Professor O'Reilly, 53 ADMIN. L. REv. 343
(2001) (responding that aspects unique to veterans' benefits law are not adequately
addressed by such a remedy).
265. 155 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
266. See id. at 1362 ("The underlying systems being inconsistent in purpose and
procedure, it seems inappropriate to adopt wholesale the test for materiality from
one benefits scheme for application in the other.").
267. White v. Principi, 243 F.3d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
268. Id. (quoting Schisler v. Heckler, 787 F.2d 76, 81 (2d Cir. 1986)).
269. Id. at 1380-81.
270. 243 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
271. Id. at 1381.
272. See 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a), (d)(1) (1994 & Supp. lV 1998) (instructing the
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals to set aside an agency decision that is arbitrary and
capricious, contrary to constitutional right, in excess of statutory authority, or
without observance of procedure).
273. Boyerv. West, 210 F.3d 1351, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
274. Id. (quoting Delverde, SrL v. United States, 202 F.3d 1360, 1363 (Fed. Cir.
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and legislative history; and applies the relevant canons of
interpretation.
In construing the text, the court emphasizes the importance of
giving effect to all terms.276 In construing particular terms, the court
notes that, with some exceptions, "identical words used in different
parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning." 277 The
court 27has
also cited dictionary definitions in construing particular
8
terms.

One possible exception to the rule of giving effect to all terms is
when the statute uses hortatory language. In Rodriguez v. West, 9 the
Federal Circuit cast doubt on whether agency statutes, which
provided that the agency "shall" provide certain kinds of assistance,
created enforceable rights.

28 0

A number of CAVC decisions had

did.281'

indicated that they
The Federal Circuit reasoned that such
provisions "create no enforceable rights for a benefits applicant who
did not receive assistance in presenting a claim. 282 The provisions
simply did not prescribe a remedy for breach.2 8 3 The provisions
"appear to be hortatory rather than to impose enforceable legal
obligations upon the Secretary.,

284

The court has also looked more broadly, examining the design of
the statute, 28528 similar
statutes286 and the overall purpose of the
statutory scheme.287

2000)).
275. Id.
276. See Splane v. West, 216 F.3d 1058, 1068-69 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (avoiding an
interpretation of the statute's language that would render any portion "meaningless
or superfluous"); Glover v. West, 185 F.3d 1328, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("Glover's
interpretation of the regulation renders these conditions meaningless, a result
contrary to the canons of statutory interpretation.").
277. Nat'l Org. of Veterans' Advocates v. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs, 260 F.3d 1365,
1379 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (quoting Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995)).
278. See Westberry v. Principi, 255 F.3d 1377, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("The
dictionary definition of the term 'apparent' supports the Secretary's construction.").
279. 189 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
280. Id. at 1355.
281. Id.
282. Id. (emphasizing the exhortive nature of the language in the statute).
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. See Pierce v. Principi, 240 F.3d 1348, 1352-53 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (determining
from the design of a veteran's benefits statute that the legislature intended to limit
evidence that can be used in a clear and unmistakable error challenge).
286. See Splane v. West, 216 F.3d 1058, 1068-69 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (finding that 38
U.S.C. § 1119(a) (2), relating to tropical diseases, is not in payi materia with (a) (4),
relating to multiple sclerosis, so that the statutory time limitations for tropical
diseases cannot be extended to claims for MS).
287. See Meeks v. West, 216 F.3d 1363, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (stating that
"statutory interpretation is a holistic endeavor that requires consideration of a
statutory scheme in its entirety" and that the court "[must] not be guided by a single
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B.

Veterans-Benefits-Specific Canons

The Federal Circuit frequently emphasizes that the scheme for
awarding veterans benefits is "uniquely pro-claiman ", 28 Because the
scheme is so pro-claimant, in interpreting veterans benefits statutes,
courts often apply the canon that "interpretive doubt is to be resolved
in the veteran's favor." 28s
There exist limits, however, to the
application of this canon. The Federal Circuit has repeatedly
indicated that claimants "cannot rely upon the generous spirit that
suffuses the law generally to override the clear meaning of a
particular provision."2

sentence, or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole
law. ..."); see also Pierce, 240 F.3d at 1353 (explaining that the "overall statutory
scheme for reviewing veterans' benefits decisions" indicates congressional intent to
limit evidence used in a clear and unmistakable error challenge to the evidence that
was of record at the time the decision was made).
288. Hodge v. West, 155 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (recognizing that the
Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court both view the nature of veterans' benefits
statutes as "strongly and uniquely pro-claimant."); see also Elkins v. Gober, 229 F.3d
1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (explaining that although treating veterans claims
separately on appeal "may lead to less efficient use of judicial resources," it "is
inevitable given the pro-claimant, nonadversarial, ex parte system that supplies
veterans benefits."); Hayre v. West, 188 F.3d 1327, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (stating that
giving claimants notice of the deficiencies in their claims is important because "in
the veterans' uniquely claimant friendly system of awarding compensation, systemic
justice and fundamental considerations of procedural fairness carry great
significance.").
289. Nat'l Org. of Veterans' Advocates v. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs, 260 F.3d 1365,
1378 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (quoting Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994)); see also
Disabled Am. Veterans v. Gober, 234 F.3d 682, 692 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (recognizing that
the doctrine of resolving ambiguities in veterans' benefits statutes in favor of the
veteran has modified the traditional Chevron analysis); Forshey v. Gober, 226 F.3d
1299, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (explaining that the idea that the meaning of language
in a statute be resolved in the veteran's favor "derives from an appreciation of the
benevolent intent behind the veterans system."); Hix v. Gober, 225 F.3d 1377, 1380
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (noting that "veterans benefits statutes are construed liberally in
favor of the veteran").
290. Disabled Am. Veterans, 234 F.3d at 692; Boyer v. West, 210 F.3d 1351, 1355
(Fed. Cir. 2000); Haines v. West, 154 F.3d 1298, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Richard v.
West, 161 F.3d 719, 723 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see alsoJackson v. Principi, 265 F.3d 1366,
1370 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (noting that the principles of fairness used to interpret statutes
in previous veterans cases cannot force the court to ignore clear statutory language
that may not be in the claimant's favor); Butler v. Principi, 244 F.3d 1337, 1340 (Fed.
Cir. 2001) ("Although the veterans benefits adjudication system is nonadversarial
and paternalistic, the veteran still has certain legal procedural requirements to move
forward with a claim."); Meeks, 216 F.3d at 1367 (explaining that the duty to assist is
limited and "does not include granting benefits that cannot be supported in law and
by the facts of the particular case."); Glover v. West, 185 F.3d 1328, 1332 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (recognizing that although veteran's benefits statutes should be construed in
favor of the claimant, the plain language of a regulation cannot be ignored).
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C. Legislative History
In construing agency statutes and regulations, the Federal Circuit
has sometimes reviewed legislative history.291 Although "the starting
point in every case involving construction of a statute is the language
itself, 292 the court will then look to the legislative history "if the
statutory language is unclear." 293 In discussing particular types of
legislative history, the court has noted that "the remarks of a single
legislator, even the sponsor, are not controlling in analyzing the
legislative history, 29 4 but that such statements "must be considered
with the Reports of both Houses and the statements of other
Congressmen.''95 The court has cited Senate reports and the
"Explanatory Statement of Compromise Agreement" in analyzing
legislative history.296
D. Common Law
The court has also considered the applicability of common-law
principles. In Lofion v. West,29 7 the court rejected a challenge to a VA
regulation that bars a veteran's survivor from obtaining dependency
and indemnity compensation benefits if the survivor intentionally
and wrongfully killed the veteran.2 s Even though the statute was
"silent as to the issue addressed by the regulation,"29 9 the court noted
that "Congress legislates against a common law background."
The
291. See Nat'l Org. of Veterans' Advocates, 260 F.3d at 1377-78 (noting that the
legislative history appeared to favor the government's position); Pierce, 240 F.3d at
1352 (considering the legislative history of a veterans benefits statute concerning
evidence that can be admitted in a clear and unmistakable error claim and finding
that the statute limits evidence to that of record at the time the decision was made);
Gilpin v. West, 155 F.3d 1353, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (finding no guidance in the
legislative history to define the time a veteran must be disabled to receive
compensation for a service connected injury); Ledford v. West, 136 F.3d 776, 782
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (finding no basis in the legislative history for concluding that the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply).
292. Allen v. Principi, 237 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (quoting Madison
Galleries v. United States, 870 F.2d 627, 629 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
293. Id. (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984)).
294. Pierce, 240 F.3d at 1353 (quoting Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 311
(1979)).
295. Id.
296. Nat'l Org. of Veterans'Advocates,260 F.3d at 1378.
297. 198 F.3d 846 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
298. See id. at 849 (holding that a widow who sought dependency and indemnity
compensation (DIC) for the death of her husband cannot reopen claim because she
had intentionally shot him, causing his death).
299. Id. at 850 (reviewing claimant's argument that a regulation denying veteran's
benefits to those who intentionally killed the veteran was invalid because the statute
that extends DIG benefits to survivors does not state the same exception).
300. Id. (explaining that it is unlikely that Congress would have intended to
extend DIG benefits to persons who would receive them as a result of their own
homicidal acts).
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regulation simply codified a well-known common law principle
known as the "slayer's rule," which denies insurance and benefits to
those who expect to receive them as a result of wrongful acts, such as
homicide!"' Thus, "[i] n light of the universality of the common law
rule and the fact that Congress did not foreclose its application,"' 2
the court concluded that the regulation was "an entirely reasonable
gap-filling measure.""3 The court held that the agency "acted
reasonably in promulgating a regulation codifying the slayer's rule
and applying it to DIG benefits.""
E. PracticalConsiderations
In at least one case, Rodriguez v. West,0 5 the Federal Circuit's
regulatory-construction analysis was driven by pragmatism. 6
In
deciding whether an informal claim had to be in writing, the court
noted that its conclusion was "supported not only by the language
and structure of the regulations, but also by practical
considerations. °7 The court reasoned that because such a large
number of claims are filed with the agency, it would be almost
impossible to determine the date a claim was filed or what benefits
the claimant desired, without written evidence of the claim. 08
Allowing a claimant to file an oral statement would make the
administration of veterans benefits difficult and inefficient:3 0 As the
court stated, "[i]t would often be impossible for the Department's
personnel who handle and process these claims to recollect many of
the oral applications made, let alone the details of those claims.3 10
Thus, the court concluded that the CAVC correctly held that
according to the DVA regulations, an informal claim application
must be in writing. 1

301. Lofion, 198 F.3d at 850 (defining the slayer's rule).
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. 189 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
306. Id. at 1354 (interpreting a DVA regulation to determine that an informal
claim for benefits must be in writing).
307. Id.
308. See id. (considering the difficulties that would arise if informal claims were
not required to be submitted in writing).
309. Id. (describing the difficulties the agency would encounter if claimants were
permitted to file informal claims with oral statements).
310. Id.
311. Id.
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VII. AGENCY STATUTES AND REGULATIONS
A. Elements of a Disability-Benefits Claim
A veteran's claim for service-connected disability benefits has five
elements: (1) veteran status; (2) existence of a current disability;
(3) a connection between the veteran's service and the disability;
312
(4) degree of disability; and (5) effective date of the disability.
Recent Federal Circuit decisions have addressed these elements.
In Gilpin v. West, 313 the Federal Circuit upheld a regulation which
requires a showing of a current disability in order to establish service
connection.1 4 The court noted that the relevant statute was "not
plain on its face"05 and that "all that can be fairly said about the
statute is that it is silent on the matter of when the disabled veteran
must be disabled."01 6 The court concluded, "the requirement of
current symptomatology was a rational and permissible way of filling
the 'gap' in the statute."1 7
In Sanchez-Benitez v. Principi,3 8 the court considered whether pain
alone is a "disability."31 9 The CAVC had held that "pain alone,
without a diagnosed or identifiable underlying malady or condition,
does not in and of itself constitute
a disability for which service
20
connection may be granted.

The court noted that this was "an interesting, indeed perplexing,
question, but not one that we need or can decide in this appeal"3 2'
because of the facts of the case. The court indicated, however, that
"[e]ven assuming arguendo that free-standing pain wholly unrelated to
any current disability is a compensable disability, such pain cannot be
compensable in the absence of proof of an in-service disease or injury
"3
to which the current pain can be connected by medical evidence. 2
The court found that a "pain alone" claim fails when a claimant does
312. Maggittv. West, 202 F.3d 1370, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
313. 155 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
314. See id. at 1354 (holding that statute requires "current symptomatology" at the
time claim is filed in order to receive compensation for post traumatic stress
disorder).
315. Id. at 1355.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 1355-56 (finding that the requirement of current symptomatology is
supported in light of other statutes involving the same statutory provision).
318. 259 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
319. See id. at 1357-59 (holding that compensation could not be awarded for neck
pain where the complainant demonstrated no nexus between the current pain and
the neck trauma experienced while in service).
320. Sanchez-Benitez v. West, 13 Vet. App. 282, 285 (1999).
321. Id. at 1361.
322. Id.
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not show a connection between the pain and an in-service injury. s
In Sanchez-Benitez, there was "clear fact-finding by the Board, affirmed
by the Veterans Court, that Mr. Sanchez-Benitez's current pain
cannot be attributed to the neck trauma he experienced while in
service."'
Thus, "[w]ithout a factual finding of a medical nexus
between the pain and the neck trauma, " sn the court could not decide
whether he could be compensated for his current pain.326
B. Bars to ReceivingBenefits in General
Drug and alcohol abuse
Veterans benefits statutes provide that "no compensation shall be
paid if the disability is a result of the veteran's own willful misconduct
or abuse of alcohol or drugs."327 The CAVC held that this provision
barred compensation in cases in which veterans claimed that a
service-connected disability, such as post-traumatic stress disorder,
caused them to abuse alcohol or drugs."8 In Allen v. Principi,321 the
Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the statute "does not preclude
a veteran from receiving compensation for an alcohol or drug abuse
disability acquired as secondary to, or as a symptom of, a veteran's
service-connected disability." °
The court emphasized that compensation was permitted only
"where there is indeed a causal relationship between a serviceconnected disability, such as PTSD, and an alcohol or drug abuse
disability." 31' Furthermore, the court stated, "[i] t is up to the VA to
determine how to assess whether an alcohol or drug abuse disability is
actually caused by a service-connected disability."3 2 The court further
333
indicated, however, that "the holding of the case is quite limited."
The court explained this limitation, noting that it would only grant
compensation in cases where there exists "clear medical evidence
establishing that the alcohol or drug abuse disability is indeed caused
1.

323.

Id. at 1361-62.

324. Id. at 1362.
325. Id.
326. See id.

327. 38 U.S.C. § 1110 (1994).
328. Barela v. West, 11 Vet. App. 280, 283 (1998), overruled by Allen v. Principi, 237
F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
329. 237 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
330. Id. at 1375.

331. Id. at 1378.
332. Id. (explaining that upon examining a claim, the Board could decide that the
alcohol or drug abuse disability was willful and not caused by the service-connected
disability).
333. Id. at 1381.
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by a veteran's primary service-connected disability" and is not due to
willful wrongdoing. 4
2.

Willful misconduct
VA regulations prohibit compensation for injuries resulting from

"willfull misconduct." 35 In Yeoman v. West, 336 the court considered an

appeal in a case in which the agency found that consuming six to
eight beers and not sleeping for forty-five hours prior to an
automobile accident constituted willful misconduct.3 7 The court
rejected arguments that the agency erred in relying on state law in
considering whether the actions constituted "an act involving
conscious wrongdoing or known prohibited action. '3
Slayer's rule" 9
VA regulations also bar a veteran's survivor from obtaining benefits
if the survivor intentionally and wrongfully killed the veteran. ° In
Lofton v. West,34' the court rejected a challenge to this regulation. The
court reasoned that, even though the statute did not contain such an
exception, the regulation at issue was "an entirely reasonable gapfilling measure.042 According to the court, the regulation codified a
long-standing common law principle known as the "slayer's rule"
which bars wrongdoers from obtaining insurance
and other benefits
3
as a direct consequence of their wrongful acts.
3.

334. Id.
335. See 38 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1994) (providing "an injury or disease incurred
during active ... service will be deemed to have been incurred in the line of duty...
unless the injury was a result of the person's own willful misconduct or abuse of
alcohol or drugs."); 38 C.F.R. § 3.1(n) (2001) (defining willful misconduct as "an act
involving conscious wrongdoing or known prohibited action."); id. § 3.301(b)
(stating "[d]isability pension is not payable for any condition due to the veteran's
own willful misconduct.").
336. 140 F.3d 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
337. Id. at 1444-45.
338. Id. at 1446 (explaining that the VA regulations permit the use of Iowa state
law in interpreting whether an act constitutes willful misconduct).
339. See supra Part VI.D and accompanying notes (discussing the court's use of the
common law (namely the "slayer's rule") as a means of statutory construction to
uphold veterans benefits regulations).
340. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.11 (2001) (providing "any person who has intentionally and
wrongfully caused the death of another person is not entitled to pension,
compensation, or dependency and indemnity compensation . ..
341. 198 F.3d 846 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
342. Id. at 850.
343. Id.
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C. Rules Applicable to ParticularTypes of Claims
1.

Claims, general
VA statutes provide that "[a] specific claim in the form prescribed
by the Secretary" must be filed in order for benefits to be paid under
VA statutes.' The Federal Circuit has addressed the prerequisites for
a claimant making a "claim" for VA benefits.
In Fleshman v. Wests the court held that because an application
did not contain a signature, it was not a "claim." 6 The court noted
that VA statutes required that in order to receive benefits from the
Department of Veterans Affairs, an applicant must file a claim "in the
form prescribed by the Secretary."4 7 The court agreed with the
agency that the statute required applicants to submit a claim in a
particular format, containing specified information, and signed by
the claimant, as called for by the blocks on the application form.-"
The court reasoned that its holding did not mean that "a formal
application submitted on the appropriate form will never be deemed
sufficient unless it is letter perfect."" 9 The court concluded, however,
that if the Department of Veterans Affairs returns a form to an
applicant requesting that he provide additional information, the
applicant will not have satisfied the "in the form prescribed by the
Secretary" requirement of the statute until he submits the requested
information. m
The Federal Circuit has also addressed informal claims.
In
Rodriguez v. West, 51 the court held that an informal claim for benefits
must be in writing.5 2 The claimant, a surviving spouse, visited a
Regional Office four times, only to be told that she was not entitled to
a certain kind of benefit. 53 The court held that these visits and
inquiries about benefits did not constitute "informal claims" within

344. 38 U.S.C. § 5101(a) (1994).
345. 138 F.3d 1429 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
346. See id. at 1431-32 (holding a claimant's signature is a critical element of
information required by the Department of Veteran Affairs and is, therefore,
essential when filing a claim).
347. Id. at 1431 (citing 38 U.S.C. § 5101 (a) and alluding to its specificity).
348. Id. at 1431-32.
349. Id. at 1432.
350. Id.
351. 189 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
352. See id. at 1353-54 (stating that 38 C.F.R. § 3.155(a), allowing for informal
claims, does not authorize oral informal claims).
353. See id. at 1352 (concerning a claimant who was initially denied a surviving
spouse's pension because her Social Security benefits exceeded the permissible
maximum, and was then denied such pension on subsequent occasions after
notification that her Social Security benefits would terminate).
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the meaning of the regulation. 54
2. New and material evidence
A veteran whose claim has been finally denied-either by failing to
appeal a final Regional Office or Board decision, or by losing before
the CAVC or the Federal Circuit-may seek to "reopen" the claim
that was previously disallowed.155 In order to reopen a claim, the
veteran must present "new and material evidence."5 6 There exists no
time limit for seeking to reopen a previously disallowed claim;5 7 nor

is a veteran limited as to the number of times he can seek to reopen a
claim.35 8 Some veterans have filed as many as a dozen reopened
claims over the years.359
If the veteran submits new and material evidence, and the claim is
reopened, the agency is required to "review the former disposition of
the claim."3' If this review results in a grant of benefits, the effective
date for the grant of benefits is the date the veteran submitted a
claim to reopen, not the date of the original claim.3 6'
In 1998, in Hodge v. West, the Federal Circuit made a major change
in the standard for reopening previously denied claims.361 Until that
time, the CAVC's 1991 decision in Colvin v. Derwinski set the
standard test for new and material evidence, and was applied in
thousands of cases.3 64 In Colvin, the CAVC held that in order for
evidence to be material, "there must be a reasonable possibility that
the new evidence, when viewed in the context of all the evidence,

354. See id. at 1354 (reasoning that if such visits and inquiries constituted
"informal claims," serious problems in the operation of the benefits programs would
result because it would be difficult for the Department's personnel who handle these
claims to recollect the oral applications).
355. 38 U.S.C. § 5108 (1994).
356. Id.
357.

BARTON F. STIGHMAN ET AL., VETERANS BENEFrrs MANUAL

§ 12.2.2.1, at 923

(2001). Indeed, section 5108 does not condition the reopening of a disallowed claim
on timeliness. The presentation of "new and material evidence" is its only explicit
requirement.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. 38 U.S.C. § 5108.
361. See 38 U.S.C. § 5110(a) (1994) (providing that generally when an award is
based on a claim that has been reopened, the effective date of the award is
determined based on the facts found, but that the date will not be earlier than the
date of receipt of application); see also 38 C.F.R. § 3.400(r) (2001) (providing that the
effective date of reopened claims is generally the "[d] ate of receipt of claim or date
entitlement arose, whichever is later..
).
362. Hodge v. West, 155 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
363. 1 Vet. App. 171 (1991).
364. See Hodge, 155 F.3d at 1360 (observing that the Court of Veteran's Appeals
has applied this test consistently since its establishment).
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both new and old, would change the outcome."065 In Hodge, the
Federal Circuit invalidated the test, holding that the requirement
that the new evidence change the outcome was inconsistent with the
governing statute.3 As a result of the Hodge decision, hundreds of
cases were remanded to the Board for consideration of the revised
test.
The Federal Circuit revisited the Colvin test in Anglin v. West.367 The
court held that the requirement that new and material evidence is
not cumulative of other evidence of record is consistent with the
governing regulation8ee The court noted that it had overruled
Colvin's materiality element, which required that evidence affect the
outcome of a case, "but [it] left the remainder of the Colvin test
intact.""69
The court stated that "the paramount concern in
evaluating any judicial test for new and material evidence is its
consistency with the regulation."7 0 Moreover, according to the plain
language of the regulation, "evidence that is merely cumulative of
other evidence in the record cannot be new and material even if that
evidence had not been previously presented to the Board."3 7
In addition to changing the standard for determining whether
evidence is new and material, the court has addressed narrower issues
applicable to specific cases. For example, in Routen v. West,372 the
court held that failure to apply an evidentiary presumption did not
constitute "new and material evidence. 3 73

The court noted that a

presumption is not "any form of evidence" and thus cannot constitute
new and material evidence.3 74
In D'Amico v. West,375 the Federal Circuit overruled previous CAVC

holdings that the statutory new and material evidence standard is
inapplicable when the original claim was denied because a veteran
365. Colvin, 1 Vet. App. at 174 (noting that this is a bright-line rule followed in
other federal courts and is consistent with judicial precedent).
366. See Hodge 155 F.3d at 1361 (noting that it appeared that the CAVC failed to
examine the requirements of 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a) and applying an inappropriate
definition of materiality). But cf 38 C.F.R. § 3.156 (2001) (providing that material
evidence is evidence "so significant that it must be considered," although the rule
does not require that such evidence change the outcome of the case).
367. 203 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
368. See id. at 1346-47 (holding that although Hodge overruled a portion of the
Colvin test, the first prong of the test requiring non-cumulative evidence is consistent
with the regulation's demands).
369. Id. at 1347.
370. Id. (citing Hodge 155 F.3d at 1361).
371. Id.
372. 142 F.3d 1434 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
373. See id. at 1440.
374. Id. at 1439.
375. 209 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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did not establish veteran status. 6 The rationale of the CAVC cases
was that veterans benefits statutes did not apply until a claimant
established

veteran

status.

7

The

Federal

Circuit

disagreed,

concluding that the new and material evidence statute "applies to the
reopening of claims disallowed for any reason.,378
In Jackson v. Principi,379 the court rejected the argument that it was
improper for the Board to address the question of whether the
claimant had offered new and material evidence sufficient to reopen
his claim after the Regional Office had ruled in his favor.30 The
court noted that the Board had "a jurisdictional responsibility to
determine whether it was proper for a claim to be reopened."'
3.

Clearand unmistakable error
Under VA statutes and regulations, a veteran can seek "revision" of
a prior final decision on the basis of "clear and unmistakable error"
(also known as "CUE") .38

A claim of clear and unmistakable error is

a collateral attack on a prior final decision, usually after the time to
appeal that decision has lapsed. 5 When a veteran establishes clear
and unmistakable error in a prior final decision, it has "the same
376. See id. at 1326 (citing 38 U.S.C. § 5108 and observing that nothing in the
statutory language suggests it does not apply to such claims).
377. See Laruan v. West, 11 Vet. App. 80, 84-86 (1998) (en banc) (noting that
designation as a veteran bestows certain procedural advantages and evidentiary
benefits, and, therefore, in fairness one must establish veteran status before he is
entitled to these advantages and benefits).
378. D'Amico, 209 F.3d at 1327 (observing that there is "no indication in the
legislative history that Congress intended to limit the new and material evidence
standard of section 5108 to persons who have established their veteran status to the
satisfaction of the agency."). The court dismissed the legislative history recalled by
the Laruan court and stated that the "relevant" legislative history indicates that the
new and material evidence requirement is applicable to a claimant seeking review of
"any prior decision affecting the claimant with respect to benefits under laws
administered by the [agency]." See H.R. REP. No. 100-963, at 37 (1988), reprinted in
1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5782, 5819.
379. 265 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
380. See id. at 1369 (concluding that sections 511(a) and 7104(a) authorize the
Board to make a final decision on the issue of whether new and material evidence
has been presented by a veteran); see generally 38 U.S.C. § 7104 (1994) (providing
that issues that are subject to review by the Secretary under section 511 (a) are also
subject to a final decision by the Board and based on the entire record in the
proceeding, as well as upon consideration of all evidence and applicable provisions
of the law); id. § 511(a) (providing in part that "[t]he Secretary shall decide all
questions of law and fact necessary to a decision by the Secretary").
381. Jackson, 265 F.3d at 1369 (noting the Board had jurisdiction under section
7104(b) because Jackson's initial claim was never appealed to the Board).
382. See 38 U.S.C. § 5109A (Supp. IV 1998) ("Revision of [Regional Office]
decisions on grounds of clear and unmistakable error"); id. § 7111 ("Revision of
[Board] decisions on grounds of clear and unmistakable error").
383. See Crippen v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 412, 418 (1996) (defining a claim of CUE
and surveying judicial precedent establishing the requirements for a valid CUE
claim).
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effect as if the corrected decision had been made on the date of the
reversed decision."" In other words, the veteran is entitled to the
effective date, which commences on the date of the decision that was
collaterally attacked, including any benefits due since that date.
The Federal Circuit has issued a number of decisions clarifying
CUE standards. First, the Federal Circuit has defined the term
"evidence." The CUE statute provides that "[i]f evidence establishes
the [clear and unmistakable] error, the prior decision shall be
reversed or revised."" 5 In Pierce v. Principi, 6 the court held that the
term "evidence" meant evidence of record at the time of the
challenged decision. 7 Thus, in making a CUE determination,
evidence submitted after the challenged decision is not considered.m
Although the statute did not limit "evidence" to evidence of record at
the time the challenged decision was made, the court concluded that
"the legislative history of the statute, the purpose of the statute, and
the overall statutory scheme for reviewing veterans' benefits decisions
all indicate that Congress intended the evidence to be so limited. " 389
Second, the court has addressed the nature of the error. The court
has repeatedly affirmed that in order to be "clear and unmistakable,"
the error must be "outcome-determinative," i.e., it must be an error
that changed the outcome of the decision being challenged. 390
Further, the court has held that breach of the duty to assist cannot
constitute CUE. 9'
Third, the court addressed the validity of newly-enacted CUE
regulations. Before 1997, a Board decision could not be the subject
of a CUE challenge. 92 In 1997, Congress enacted a statute s93 that
384.

38 C.F.R. § 3.105(a) (2001).

385. 38 U.S.C. § 5109A(a).
386. 240 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
387. See id. at 1353-54 (noting that the interpretation of "evidence" as stated in
section 5109A is consistent with the purpose of providing for CUE review).
388. See id. at 1354 (noting that evidence submitted after the decision being
challenged would not be part of the record).
389. Id. at 1353.
390. See Yates v. West, 213 F.3d 1372, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (concluding that
revision of a Board decision based on clear and unmistakable error requires an error
that would have manifestly changed the outcome of the decision when it was made);
Bustos v. West, 179 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding the requirement that
the claimant show an error that would manifestly change the outcome of a prior
decision is consistent with 38 U.S.C. § 3.105(a)).
391. See Hayre v. West, 188 F.3d 1327, 1332-33 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that a
breach of the duty to assist is not an error that would manifestly change the outcome
of the prior decision, and therefore, is not an error that should constitute CUE); see
also Roberson v. Principi, 251 F.3d 1378, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing Hayre and
holding a breach of the duty to assist cannot form the basis for the CUE claim).
392. See Smith v. Brown, 35 F.3d 1516, 1527 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that CUE
review applied to review of Regional Office decisions and not decisions of the
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allows Board decisions to be challenged on the basis of CUE. In
January 1999, the Department of Veterans Affairs published final
regulations implementing that statute.394
Several veterans
organizations challenged the regulations on various grounds, alleging
a failure to comply with rulemaking procedures and arguing that the
regulations were arbitrary and capricious. 35- The court rejected most
of the challenges, but did invalidate a rule that prevented the Board
from reviewing a CUE claim on the merits if that claim had been the
subject of a motion that was denied for failure to comply with the
pleading requirements.39 6 The court reasoned that the rule was
contrary to the statutory requirement that a CUE claim "shall be
decided by the Board on the merits. '3 9
Fourth, the court considered the relationship between challenges
to Regional Office decisions and challenges to Board decisions. In
Donovan v. West,3 99 the court rejected the argument that an agency

regulation allowed a veteran to challenge a final decision of the VA
Regional Office denying a claim for a service-connected disability,
despite an intervening decision of the Board of Veterans' Appeals
that rejected the same claim.3 9 The court reasoned that the Board
decision barred the claimant from relitigating this issue because if the
Regional Office were to attempt to decide that question de novo, it
would be reviewing a decision of the appellate tribunal that
customarily reviews the decisions of the Regional Offices.4" The
court noted that "it would be 'odd' to 'permit an inferior [the
Regional Office] to collaterally review the actions of a superior [the

Board).

393. See Pub. L. No. 105-111, § 1(b), 111 Stat. 2271-72 (1997) (codified as 38
U.S.C. § 7111) (permitting veterans benefits decisions to be reviewed by CUE and
reversed when CUE establishes error).
394. See 38 C.F.R. §§ 20.1400-.1411 (2001) (allowing revision of Board decision on

the grounds of clear and unmistakable error).

395. See Disabled Am. Veterans v. Gober, 234 F.3d 682, 686 (Fed. Cir. 2000)

(challenging the validity of 38 C.F.R. §§ 20.1400-.1411 in a suit filed by Disabled
American Veterans, National Organization of Veterans' Advocates, Inc., Paralyzed

Veterans of America, and Vietnam Veterans of America, Inc.).
396. See id. at 698-99, 704 (holding Rule 1404(b) invalid as it operates with Rule
1404(c), because it prevents the claim from being considered on the merits, as
required by the statute, but finding all other rules challenged to be consistent with
the statute).
397. Id. at 704 (citing 38 U.S.C. § 7111(e))

(stating that a motion not in

compliance with the pleading requirements would not be reviewed, thereby
preventing consideration on the merits of the claim).
398. 158 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
399. See id. at 1381 (affirming the finding that the Board's decision is a final
decision denying the claim on the merits).
400. Id. at 1382.
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Board], at least as an initial matter.,,401

In Dittrich v. West,4° ' the court again considered the issue argued in
Donovan-whether a Regional Office could consider a CUE claim
that the Board had already denied. 4 3 The court rejected the
claimant's argument that the enactment of a statute after the Donovan
decision required a different result.4 The new statute authorized
challenges to both Regional Office and Board decisions. 4 5 Review of
Board decisions for CUE had previously been prohibited. 46 The
court again held that a Regional Office may not review collaterally an
earlier Board decision on the same operative facts.4 7 Thus, the court
concluded, the Board's decision "necessarily subsumed" the Regional
Office decision. 4 8
The Federal Circuit held that subsuming did not occur in Brown v.
West. 4°0 The court noted, "[t] his is not a case in which the substance
of the challenge to the prior [Regional Office] determination was
rejected in an intervening decision of the Board of Veterans'
Appeals" because the Board in its earlier decisions "did not decide
the same claim that is now at issue . .,,410
Thus, the court concluded
"there has been no Board decision that subsumes the 1947
[Regional
4
Office] determination as to Mr. Brown's present claim. 1
4. Liberalizinglaw
In Spencer v. Brown,1 2 the Federal Circuit held that VA statutes do
not preclude consideration of a claim, upon a showing of a new basis
of entitlement to a benefit as a result of an intervening change in law,
even though based on facts in a previously (and finally) denied

401. Id. (quoting Smith v. Brown, 35 F.3d 1516,1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
402. 163 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
403. See id. at 1351-52 (citing Donovan for the proposition that a Regional Office
was prohibited from reviewing a final Board decision).
404. See id. at 1352 (noting that although Donovan was decided under a different
statutory directive, the new statute essentially requires the same result and Regional

Offices are not authorized to review an earlier Board decision).

405. See id. (stating that the new statute was enacted specifically to allow challenges
to Board decisions, but it did not authorize a Regional Office to challenge a Board
decision).
406. See Spencer v. Brown, 17 F.3d 368, 371-72 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (providing an
exception where "new and material evidence is secured") (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 5108

(1994)).

407. See Dittrich, 163 F.3d at 1352-53 (holding that the statute permits only the

Board, and not Regional Offices, to CUE review of the Board's decisions).

408.
409.
410.
411.
412.

Id. at 1353.
203 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1381.
Id. at 1381-82.
17 F.3d 368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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This concept is referred to as a "liberalizing law."4 4 In

Routen v. West,4 15 the court held that a change in the standard for an
"liberalizing law." 416

evidentiary presumption did not constitute such a
The court reasoned that the change in the evidentiary standard was
"procedural in nature" and did not "effect a substantive change in the
law; that is, it does not create a new cause of action, since no new
basis of entitlement is created., 41 7 Thus, "[t]he peacetime service
veterans simply benefit from a stronger presumption toward the same
ultimate disability
benefit entitlement, based on the same factual
41 8
predicates."

D. Rules Applicable to ParticularTypes of Benefits
1. Survivors benefits
A number of cases addressed the criteria for obtaining survivors
benefits. The Federal Circuit has held that certain kinds of claims do
not survive a veteran's death and thus a survivor may not receive
benefits based on those claims.4 9 For other kinds of claims, the
Federal Circuit has held that certain criteria must be met for a
survivor to receive benefits. In Jones v. West,420 the court held that, for
a surviving spouse to be entitled to accrued benefits, the veteran must
have had a claim pending at the time of his death or else be entitled
to them under an existing rating decision. 42' The court reasoned that
a surviving spouse's "accrued benefits claim is derivative of the
veteran's claim. 4 2 As a consequence of the derivative nature of the
surviving spouse's entitlement to a veteran's accrued benefits claim,
the surviving spouse has no claim upon which to derive his or her
413. See id. at 372-73 (concluding that without presenting evidence to show a new
claim of entitlement under a new statute, de novo review is not available to a veteran
when the claim has been denied in a final decision).
414. See id. at 372 (defining "liberalizing law" as one which changed the law
substantially by creating a new entitlement to a benefit).
415.

142 F.3d 1434 (Fed. Cir. 1998).

416. See id. at 1441-42 (stating that the new regulation does not define
"liberalizing" and addresses the procedural issues of the dates of benefit awards
made subject to a new law).
417. Id. at 1442.
418. Id.
419. See Haines v. West, 154 F.3d 1298 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (rejecting the argument

that a CUE claim should survive the veteran's death); Richard v. West, 161 F.3d 719
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding a veteran's claim for service-connected disability benefits
does not survive the veteran's death); Seymour v. Principi, 245 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (finding a claim for benefits for persons disabled by treatment, vocational
treatment, or vocational rehabilitation does not survive the veteran's death).
420.

136 F.3d 1296 (Fed. Cir. 1998).

421. Id. at 1300.
422. Id. (citing Zevalkink v. Brown, 102 F.3d 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
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own claim without the veteran having a claim pending at the time of
death' 2
The Federal Circuit has also addressed how survivors benefits
claims are decided. In Hix v. Gober; the court held that where a
survivor makes a claim for Dependency and Indemnity
Compensation benefits, the veteran's level of disability is reviewed de
novo-without regard to any adverse decisions during the veteran's
lifetime.
In National Organizationof Veterans' Advocates v. Secretary of Veteran's
Affairs,4 26 the Federal Circuit revisited the issue addressed in Hix, i.e.,
how an agency should decide claims for survivors benefits when there
existed adverse decisions during the veteran's lifetime. Various
veterans organizations challenged regulatory changes implemented
in

2000.427

Those changes were in response to various CAVC

decisions interpreting the regulation.428 The court noted that the
challenged regulation was "inconsistent with the agency's
interpretation of another virtually identical statute" 42 and remanded
for the agency to "explain the rationale for the different
interpretations."4 ° The court directed the agency to conduct an
expedited rulemaking in which the agency would either "provide a
reasonable explanation" for its decision to interpret the statutes "in
inconsistent ways," or revise the regulations to be consistent.43
2.

Total disability based on individualunemployability
VA regulations require a claimant to "identify the benefit
sought."32 In Roberson v. Principi,433 the court addressed whether the
423. See id. (requiring a claim to be filed by the veteran before death of the
surviving spouse who is to receive benefits).
424. 260 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
425. See id. at 1379 (applying the statute to suggest that a claim for DIG for a
veteran's spouse should be decided without regard to any prior unfavorable
decisions before the veteran's death).
426. 260 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
427. See id. at 1367, 1371 (noting the National Organization of Veterans'
Advocates, Disabled American Veterans, and Paralyzed Veterans of America
challenged a revised 2000 regulation that would pay survivor benefits as if the
veteran's death had been service-related when the veteran was already receiving
compensation for a total disability or was entitled to receive compensation).
428. See id. at 1371 (concluding in cases before the CAVG that benefits could be
awarded to survivors when the deceased veteran had never applied for compensation
for a service-related disability).
429. Id. at 1379 (noting that one regulation allows granting of survivor benefits
without regard to any prior claim or decision, whereas the other regulation
precludes re-litigation without clear and mistakable evidence).
430. Id. at 1379-80 (stating the differing interpretations in the two regulations
centered on the explanation of the phrase 'entitled to receive").
431. Id. at 1380-81.
432. 38 C.F.R. § 3.155(a) (2001).
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claimant specifically had to request benefits for total disability based
on individual unemployability (TDIU).
The court held that
claimants are not required to make a specific request, noting "[o] nce
a veteran submits evidence of a medical disability and makes a claim
for the highest rating possible, and additionally submits evidence of
unemployability, the 'identify the benefit sought' requirement of 38
C.F.R. § 3.155(a) is met and the VA must consider TDIU. 4 - The
court noted that the agency "must determine all potential claims
raised by the evidence, applying all relevant laws and regulations,
regardless
of whether the claim is specifically labeled as a claim for
TDIU. , ,435
Further, VA regulations define "total disability" as an impairment
of mind or body "which is sufficient to render it impossible for the
average person to follow a substantially gainful occupation. 436 The
court held that this
does not require a veteran to "show 100 percent
43 7
unemployability."
The court reasoned that "the use of the word 'substantially'
suggest[ed] an intent to impart flexibility into a determination of the
veterans overall employability, whereas a requirement that the
veteran prove 100 percent unemployability leaves no flexibility." 4M
The court noted that "[w]hile the term 'substantially gainful
occupation' may not set a clear numerical standard for determining
TDIU, it does indicate an amount less than 100 percent." 9
E. Rules Applicable to ParticularDisabilities
Under veterans benefits statutes and regulations, special rules are
applicable to a number of disabilities, such as post-traumatic stress
disorder, hearing loss, and disease resulting from exposure to
radiation. In Boyer v. West, 440 the court held that the agency was not
required to consider a veteran's partial non-service-connected
hearing loss in one ear when evaluating the service connected
hearing loss in another ear.A'

433.
434.
435.
436.
437.
438.
439.
440.
441.
treated

251 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
Id. at 1384.
Id.
38 G.F.R. § 3.340(a) (2001).
Roberson, 251 F.3d at 1385.
Id.
Id.
210 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
See id. at 1356 (reasoning that Congress "intended that hearing loss be
different than other loss of paired organ function.").
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F. PresumptionsEstablishedBy VA Statutes and Regulations
As noted above, 2 the Federal Circuit has applied the nonstatutory
presumption of administrative regularity in a number of cases. VA
statutes and regulations establish a number of presumptions that
reduce evidentiary burdens for veterans. In Routen v. West,4 3 the
court discussed the nature of presumptions generally. 444 The court
noted, "[a] presumption affords a party, for whose benefit the
presumption runs, the luxury of not having to produce specific
evidence to establish the point at issue. When the predicate evidence
is established that triggers the presumption, the further evidentiary
gap is filled by the presumption." 44" Additionally, "[w]hen the
opposing party puts in proof to the contrary of that provided by the
presumption, and that proof meets the requisite level, the
presumption disappears." 6 Furthermore, "[t]he party originally
favored by the presumption is now put to his factually-supported
proof [because] the presumption does not shift the burden of
persuasion, and the party on whom that burden falls must ultimately
prove the point at issue by the requisite standard of proof." 7
The court also has addressed the standards applicable to particular
presumptions. Under VA statutes and regulations, if a specific
condition is not noted upon a veteran's entrance to service, the
veteran is entitled to a presumption that he or she was sound upon
entry to service." 8 This "presumption of soundness" may be rebutted
if "clear and unmistakable evidence demonstrates that the injury or
disease existed before acceptance and enrollment and was not
aggravated by [the veteran's military] service."" 9
In Harris v. West,4 0 the Federal Circuit considered what kinds of
evidence may be used to rebut the presumption of soundness. 41 The
court rejected the argument that the statutory presumption of
442. See supra Part IV.C (addressing the application of the presumption of
administrative regularity by the Federal Circuit).
443. 142 F.3d 1434 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
444. See id. at 1440 (stating that a presumption is never considered evidence and
any change in the evidentiary standard for a presumption is also not considered
evidence).

445. Id.
446. Id.

447. Id.

448. See 38 U.S.C. § 1111 (1994) (codifying this principle); 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(b)
(2001) (discussing wartime disability compensation and determining direct service
connections as related to a particular disability).
449. 38 U.S.C. § 1111.
450. 203 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
451. See id. at 1350 (emphasizing the breadth of inquiry into considering whether
the veteran's disease or injury existed prior to service).
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soundness could be rebutted only by contemporaneous preservice
clinical evidence or recorded history showing that the veteran was
suffering from the disease or condition in question before entering
military service. 45' The court also held that the presumption could be
rebutted by a medical professional's after-the-fact opinion regarding
the probable onset of the disease or condition.5 The court noted
that "[w]hile contemporaneous clinical evidence or recorded history
may often be necessary to satisfy the heavy burden of rebutting the
statutory presumption of soundness, we conclude that there is no
absolute rule in the statute, the regulation, or the case law requiring
such evidence before the presumption can be rebutted.",5 4 In a case
"in which a later medical opinion is based on statements made by the
veteran about the preservice history of his condition,"455 the court
stated "contemporaneous
clinical evidence and recorded history may
45 6
not be necessary.,

VA statutes and regulations also establish evidentiary presumptions
for combat veterans. In Maxson v. Gober,457 the Federal Circuit
specifically considered the presumption of aggravation associated
with combat veterans. In this case, the Court of Appeals for Veterans
Claims found that the absence of post-service medical records
relating to the claimed condition for a period of more than four
decades was "decisive" in its determination that the condition had not
been aggravated in service.458 In response, the veteran argued that
the absence of medical records could not constitute "clear and
convincing evidence" that the aggravation did not occur and that the
presumption could only be overcome "by positive medical evidence
of non-aggravation., 54 9 The court rejected this argument, however,

and concluded that "evidence of a prolonged period without medical
complaint can be considered, along with other factors ... as evidence
of whether a pre-existing condition was aggravated by military
452. See id. at 1351 (suggesting the court is interested in the overall quality of
evidence rather than what type of evidence is presented).
453. See id. at 1350-51 (commenting that the court in Miller v. West, 11 Vet. App.
345 (1998), did not find pre-service evidence essential to rebutting a presumption of
soundness in the case of a schizophrenic veteran who challenged the use of
psychiatric evaluations done after service).
454. Id. at 1351.
455. Id.
456. Id.
457. 230 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2000).

458. See id. at 1332 (observing that the absence of complaint for four decades
following service establishes a rebuttable presumption of the lack of "symptomatic
manifestations" related to such service).
459. Id. (arguing that the several "good health" records following service were not
dispositive).
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In Dambach v. Gober,6 ' the court addressed the combat presumption
again, and held that the presumption of aggravation applies to inservice injuries even where there is no record of the particular injury.
In contrast to Maxson, the court stated that the absence of an official
record cannot constitute "clear and convincing evidence" to rebut a
presumption. 2
Moreover, the court suggested that combat
conditions do not always allow for proper medical treatment and
records, and as a result, a veteran should receive the evidentiary
benefit in cases where no record exists. 4
In Splane v. West,46 1 the Federal Circuit invalidated a general

counsel opinion in part, reasoning that the opinion incorrectly
interpreted a statute as not creating a presumption of aggravation for
chronic diseases existing prior to service.40 5 Because congressional
intent supported a presumption of aggravation in such cases, the
Splane court held that the agency's interpretation exceeded the
powers delegated to the DVA by Congress.466 Consequently, the
veteran could argue that the presumption applies to his post-service
case of multiple sclerosis.
The Federal Circuit also addressed a statute that does not specify
the type of evidence required to rebut the statutory presumption. In
Forshey v. Gober,467 the court held that, even though the statute was
silent on the issue, clear and unmistakable evidence was required to
rebut the presumption.

460. Id. at 1333.
461. 223 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
462. See id. at 1380-81 (concluding that, even in the absence of an official record,
the combat veteran will receive the benefit of a three-step analysis under Section
1154(b), which is intended to provide a lighter evidentiary burden to demonstrate a
service connection to an injury or disease).
463. See id. at 1380 (stating that section 1154(b) was enacted to protect veterans,
and as such, should be applied even in those cases where veterans did not have
access to proper medical care).
464. 216 F.3d 1058 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
465. See id. at 1067-69 (determining that the general counsel failed to interpret
section 1112(a) in a way that was consistent with the plain meaning of the statute,
and consequently, interpreted the section in a manner inconsistent with
congressional intent).
466. Id. at 1670.
467. 226 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2000). This opinion was later withdrawn. See supra
note 156.
468. See Forshey, 226 F.3d at 1305 (noting that the clear and convincing standard
exists in various other statutes that deal with presumptions related to veterans).
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G. Agency Duty to Assist
A number of VA statutes and regulations provide that the agency is
to assist claimants for veterans benefits. In Glover v. West,469 the court

rejected an argument that a 1979 VA regulation 470 mandated a
reexamination of the disability for all cases in which the veteran
47
wishes to reopen a claim for a service-connected disability. '
Furthermore, the court found the agency had discretion under this
regulation to determine whether a reexamination is necessary.472 The
court reasoned that "[t]he plain language at issue" could "only be
construed to mean that the DVA is not required to request that the
veteran be reexamined in all cases, but rather only when there
is
473
evidence suggesting a material change in the veteran's disability."
In Rodriguez v. West,474 the Federal Circuit cast doubt on whether

provisions of a VA statute, which indicated that the agency "shall"
provide certain kinds of assistance to applicants in filing claims,475
created enforceable rights. The court reasoned: "It is doubtful
whether these two provisions create any enforceable rights for an
applicant for benefits who did not receive assistance in presenting a
claim. Neither provision prescribes any remedy for breach. The
provisions appear to be hortatory rather
than to impose enforceable
476
legal obligations upon the Secretary.,
In Schroeder v. West, 477 the Federal Circuit held that the duty to assist

"attaches to the investigation of all possible in-service causes of that
current disability, including those unknown to the veteran."47 8 In that
case, the veteran alleged that his eye condition was due to exposure
to Agent Orange or some other unnamed toxic substance, making
469.

185 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (concluding that, in cases where the veteran

wishes to reopen a claim, the veteran must come forward with evidence that supports

his claim of material change related to the disability).
470. 38 C.F.R. § 3.327(a) (1979) (requiring reexaminations only where it is likely
that the condition of the disability has changed significantly or where there is
evidence that the current rating may be incorrect).
471. See Glover, 185 F.3d at 1333 (refusing to address the issue of whether the
failure to reexamine constituted a breach of duty on the part of the agency).
472. See id. at 1328 (affirming the agency's decision, reasoning that requiring a
judicial determination of the necessity of a reexamination would go to the facts of

the case, which is outside the scope of the court's review).
473. Id.
474. 189 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
475. See, e.g., 38 U.S.C. § 7722(d) (1994) (requiring specifically that the Secretary

provide "to the maximum extent possible, aid and assistance" to veterans and their
dependants).
476. Rodriguez, 189 F.3d at 1355.
477. 212 F.3d 1265 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
478. Id. at 1271 (reasoning that the CAVC erred in its interpretation of what is a
"claim" and finding that a veteran need only establish a single well-grounded claim to
prompt the agency's duty to assist).
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479

out a well-grounded claim for a disability resulting from service.
Consequently, the agency was obligated to assist him in the
investigation of all his claims concerning his eye condition.480
The Federal Circuit held in Gonzales v. Weste48 that a regulation
requiring service connection determinations to be "based on review
of the entire evidence of record"48 2 did not require the Regional

Office to analyze and discuss each piece of evidence.45 Instead, the
court suggested that the regulation only requires the Regional Office
to weigh all the evidence before it, not "analyze and discuss" each
piece. 484
The court also addressed a VA regulation that requires the agency
to send an application to "any dependent who has apparent
entitlement" to obtain death benefits.4 In Westberry v. Principi,40 the
Federal Circuit held that "apparent entitlement" meant a situation
"where entitlement is evident and not merely a 'possibility.'4 87 Thus,
the agency did not have a duty to inform a spouse, who was separated
from the veteran at the time of the veteran's death, about potential
survivor benefits.4
H. Agency Authority to Request GeneralCounsel Opinions
The Federal Circuit has also rejected a challenge to the authority
of the Agency Board to request opinions from the agency's general
counsel.4

9

In Splane v. West,4 90 the court recognized the importance of

the general counsel's interpretation, but ultimately invalidated the
general counsel opinion in part. The court reasoned that the
opinion incorrectly interpreted a statute as not creating a
479. Id. at 1270.
480. Id. (holding that once the veteran had made a well-grounded claim
regarding the Agent Orange occurrence and based his claims on the same disability,
he was entitled to agency assistance in the investigation of all claims concerning his
eye disorder).
481.

218 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2000).

482. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a) (2001).
483. See Gonzaes, 218 F.3d at 1380-81 (holding statutory requirement of "review"
of evidence requires only a re-examination and not an analysis or discussion).
484. See id. at 1381 (finding no conflict between the agency's duty to assist the
veteran and the failure to analyze each piece of evidence of record).
485. 38 C.F.R. § 3.150(b) (2001) (supplementing the authority requiring provision
of such forms on request by the veteran or dependent).
486. 255 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
487. Id. at 1379.
488. Id.
489. See Splane v. West, 216 F.3d 1058, 1066 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (inferring, from the
Supreme Court's finding that agency heads have the implicit authority to delegate
powers, that the Secretary clearly can delegate to the Board the authority to request
legal opinions).
490. 216 F.3d 1058 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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presumption of aggravation for chronic diseases existing prior to
service.491 In doing so, the Federal Circuit emphasized that legal
opinions, and agency interpretations, were binding only when
consistent with the intent of Congress.492
VIII. REMEDIES

The Federal Circuit also has clarified certain aspects of the
remedies available to veterans benefits claimants.
A.

Remands

493

In Adams v. Principi, the court rejected the argument that the

CAVC should have ruled, without a remand, that the agency offered
insufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of sound condition.
The Federal Circuit held that "the remand in this case was statutorily
authorized because the remand was ordered for a reason that is
consistent with the statutory scheme the court is charged with
enforcing.""'
The court reasoned that "[t]his is not a case in which the court was
faced with evidence that was clearly insufficient to overcome the
presumption of sound condition."49 5 In fact, the court noted that the
CAVC had not remanded the matter to the Board to allow for the
introduction of new evidence, in an effort to make up for the96
recognized shortfall in the evidence supplied to the court.1
Moreover, the CAVC had concluded "that the evidence before the
Board was subject to differing interpretations.,

497

And, as a result, the

proper analysis "turned not on a weighing of the evidence"4' 9 but on
an understanding of what a particular physician meant in a report"a matter best resolved by a further factual inquiry, ideally including
further inquiry"' ' to the physician himself.
491. See id. at 1070 (reiterating that congressional intent always supersedes agency
interpretation of a regulation).
492. See id. at 1068-69 (citing Chevron, which held that agency interpretations were
to be given effect only when consistent with Congress, and determining
congressional intent in this case to oppose that of the agency).
493.

256 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

494. Id. at 1321 (confirming that the CAVC is authorized by statute to "affirm,
modify, or reverse a decision of the Board or to remand the matter, as
appropriate.").
495. Id. at 1321-22.
496. See id. at 1322 (reasoning that the evidence was not lacking in sufficiency, but
noting that it was open to different, reasonable interpretations).
497. Id. (explaining that viewing the evidence one way overcame the presumption
of sound condition, while viewing the evidence another way led to the conclusion
that the veteran's condition existed prior to service).
498. Id.
499. Id.
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The court concluded that "under these circumstances, it is
permissible for the court to remand the case so that the Board can
obtain clarification as to the import of the evidence." ' Clarification,
for the purposes of the Board, can take several forms, including an
explanation from the physician, or even supplemental medical
evidence.5°'
The court noted that its decision to remand the case was consistent
with its authority to review certain agency decisions.0 2 That is, "[i]f
the reviewing court simply cannot evaluate the record before it, the
proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to
503 remand to the
agency for additional investigation or explanation."
Significantly, although the decision was affirmed, the Federal
Circuit disagreed with the CAVC regarding the source of the
authority to remand. The CAVC indicated that the proper source of
authority for that action was the agency's statutory duty to assist the
veteran. The Federal Circuit disagreed, noting that, although a
remand might assist the veteran in obtaining benefits, the principal
purpose of the remand was "not to assist Mr. Adams to support his
claim, but to clarify whether the presumption of sound condition has
been overcome. " 504
The court further noted that this is a matter that falls under the
court's statutory
authority to remand cases when deemed
"appropriate." '5
Lastly, the Federal Circuit concluded that
" [b] ecause we are persuaded that the court was authorized to remand
the case,"50 6 the CAVC's "characterization of the ground for ordering
the remand does not affect the validity of the court's order."57
0 5 the court rejected the opposite
Yet, in Cook v. Principi,
argument-i.e., it refused to accept the argument that the CAVC
should have remanded a certain issue instead of deciding it.5°9 At
issue in the Cook case was the application of Hayre v. West. Initially,
500. Id. (observing that the Board's instruction for clarification reflects the
Board's need to establish the probability that the condition resulted from service).
501. See id. (implying that much of the controversy surrounding this case results
from ambiguities in the medical reports provided by a particular physician).
502. See id. (justifying remand in cases where the reviewing court cannot evaluate
the record before it without additional investigation).

503. Id. (quoting Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985)).
504. Id.
505. See id. (basing its authority to remand on 38 U.S.C. § 7252 (a)).
506. Id.
507. Id. (permitting the Federal Circuit to justify its remand of the case, even
though the court disagreed with a significant portion of the CAVC's reasoning).
508. 258 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2001). InJanuary 2002, the court granted a petition
to rehear the appeal en banc and withdrew it earlier opinion. See supranote 73.
509. See id. at 1327, 1332 (finding that the proper remedy for a breach of the duty
to assist was to remand the case).
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the Board had not even addressed the Hayre issue, since the Federal
Circuit decided Hayre after the Board had heard Cook's case. 5 0
The court further noted that the authority of the CAVC to decide
this issue initially was "supported by an important jurisprudential
consideration."'5' Because the Hayre rule was "a judicially-created
doctrine," 51 2 the Federal Circuit concluded that it was acceptable for

the courts to limit its application.
B. Deadlines
Gober,514

In Dambach v.
the Federal Circuit stated "[w]e believe it
would be appropriate for the Veterans Court to set a deadline by
which this veteran's case will be concluded." 5 On remand, the
CAVC declined to set a deadline, reasoning, "[tihis court is not part
of the Department of Veterans Affairs and its administrative
machinery. We are not privy to the case loads, the number of
remands taking precedence over this case, and the relative priorities
established at the BVA or the Regional Offices." 516 Moreover, the
CAVC noted that it was not in a position to order the immediate
hearing of the veteran's claim by the BVA, especially as the agency
then faced numerous claims demanding its attention. 7 By imposing
a random date on the agency, the court would be unable to
determine whether the date was even reasonable as related to the
BVA's other claims.5 ' Furthermore, as the court noted, the
conclusion of this case "is going to require further development of
the facts," and it is not possible to speculate how long such an
investigation will take. 5 9
Lastly, the CAVC pointed out that much of the delay associated
with the determination of the case had been at the request of the
510.

See id. at 1315-16 (arguing that the case should be remanded following the

Hayredecision). See generally Hayre v. West, 188 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
511. Id.
512. Id.
513. See id. (commenting that the courts should define the application of the
Hayredoctrine, as opposed to the Secretary defining its application).
514. 223 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2000).

515. Id. at 1381 (noting the veteran's poor health).
516. Dambach v. Principi, 14 Vet. App. 307, 309 (2001) (denying the immediate
award of disability benefits to veteran because such an award would require a finding
of facts by the appellate court).
517. See id. at 309 (remarking on the increased number of claims before the BDV
stemming in part from the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106475, 114 Stat. 2096 (2000), which requires "expeditious treatment" of claims).
518. See id. (comparing the assignment of an arbitrary date to 'slicing meat with a
cleaver.").
519. See id. (requiring a reexamination of the facts as well as the section 1154 issue
on remand).
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veteran-not the BVA or the Secretary.5 20 The GAVC "urge [d] the
Secretary to move this case with all the energy and dispatch he can,
5 21
consistent, of course, with a full and fair development of the facts."
C. Mandamus
West,52

In Cox v.
an attorney fee case, the court held that the CAVC
52 3
the All Writs Act, to issue writs of mandamus.
under
power,
the
has
The court noted that the All Writs Act applies to "all courts
established by Act of Congress" and that the CAVC was such a court
even though it is an Article I court, not an Article III court.52'
Consequently, in determining remedies, the CAVC has the authority
to issue writs of mandamus.
CONCLUSION

The last few years have seen a dramatic change in the veterans
benefits cases decided by the Federal Circuit. There has been a large
increase in the number of appeals filed. Furthermore, the Federal
Circuit has made major changes in the case law applicable to veterans
benefits. Moreover, it is likely that the 2000 legislation will give rise
to additional issues for the Federal Circuit to address in the near
future.

520. See id.
521. Id.
522. 149 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
523. See id. at 1362-63 (adding that the All Writs Act does not expand a court's
jurisdiction).
524. See id. at 1363 (noting that there is no language limiting the application of
the All Writs Act to Article III courts, and if so intended, Congress would have
qualified this Act to reflect such intent).

